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The	  first	  chapter	  of	  the	  project	  analyzes	  Deep	  Ecological	  philosophy,	  presented	  by	  Arne	  
Naess,	  and	  its	  inability	  to	  coalesce	  as	  a	  social	  movement	  because	  of	  Naess’	  strategic	  belief	  that	  
an	  open	  philosophical	  template,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  strategy	  of	  being	  instructive,	  instead	  of	  
rhetorically	  moving	  Deep	  Ecologists	  towards	  engaging	  concrete	  plans	  towards	  change	  to	  
mitigate	  destructive	  human	  environmental	  practices,	  as	  the	  most	  effective	  strategy.	  The	  second	  
chapter	  analyzes	  the	  Dark	  Mountain	  Project	  and	  the	  ways	  it	  has	  grown	  out	  of	  Deep	  Ecology,	  
and	  the	  ways	  the	  Dark	  Mountain	  Project	  is	  misguided	  in	  its	  interpretation	  of	  the	  works	  of	  
Robinson	  Jeffers	  as	  a	  figure	  to	  move	  humanity	  towards	  mitigating	  unsustainable	  human/more-­‐
than-­‐human	  relationships.	  The	  third	  chapter	  proposes	  John	  Steinbeck	  as	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  
intellectual	  godfather	  through	  his	  work.	  Steinbeck	  was	  scientifically	  literate,	  he	  embraced	  an	  
adequate	  Deep	  Ecological	  environmental	  ethic,	  and	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  explicitly	  address	  the	  ways	  
capitalism	  was	  a	  root	  cause	  of	  alienating	  human/more-­‐than-­‐human	  relationships,	  and	  he	  was	  
the	  most	  effective	  at	  moving	  his	  audience	  to	  address	  the	  irresponsible	  relationships	  with	  other	  
humans,	  as	  well	  as	  more-­‐than-­‐human	  nature,	  that	  is	  created	  by	  capitalism.	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Taylor Hastings 
Thesis Chapter 1 
Spring 2018 
Missed Opportunity: The Strategic and Rhetorical Miscalculations of Deep Ecology 
 
The deep ecology movement will thrive despite whatever professional philosophers like 
myself publish about their conception of it. (Naess, “Basics” 105) 
 
Deep ecology is suspicious. It lacks passion, an absence that is acutely disturbing given 
our current state of affairs. (Turner 24) 
 
Deep Ecological theory has generated many productive discussions over the past thirty-
four years and has been a prominent force in ecocritical discourse for much of that time. Deep 
Ecology proposed intrinsic value for all life and the belief that practical and psychological 
changes would need to be undertaken by humans to achieve a more sustainable, responsible, 
rational, and moral world. Deep Ecology initially resonated with, and still appeals to, many 
environmental thinkers who see a world dying at the hands of humans. Though Deep Ecology’s 
mission was simple to broadly comprehend, and agree with, it ultimately failed as a practical 
movement because, in retrospect, there has been little or no change to the trajectory of global 
environmental degradation. With such a prominent and well-embraced beginning, why has Deep 
Ecology become all but obsolete in contemporary environmental movements? Deep Ecology 
remains philosophically intact, but it ultimately failed as a movement because its creator, Arne 
Naess, strategically utilized open and ambiguous language when formulating his theory, in an 
attempt to be more inclusive to wider audiences, instead of proposing specific, concrete solutions 
to the problems he diagnosed, and refused to directly engage criticism of Deep Ecology with 
concrete solutions because he feared alienating potential followers of Deep Ecology; without a 
strategic plan, or effective exemplary leadership from Naess, or Naess’ authorization of another 
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leader of Deep Ecology, other engaged philosophers, and other environmentally conscious 
activists, were unable to pursue and codify a strategic Deep Ecological movement that could 
work to establish a biospherically egalitarian world. 
Arne Naess should be respected for creating Deep Ecology because it greatly increased 
awareness of human-caused degradation of the more-than-human world. Naess would also be 
proud that the philosophy of Deep Ecology has endured for many years because he worked hard 
to maintain philosophical viability through his Apron diagram and many published defenses. 
Naess was a philosopher and found philosophy to be a comfortable and familiar place to engage 
a solution to the environmental crisis, and in creating Deep Ecology, Naess took issue with 
purely science-based ecological frameworks because “Ecology is a limited science which makes 
use of scientific methods” (154-5). Instead of a purely scientific engagement, Naess proposed 
combining science and philosophy to create ecophilosophical engagement because “Philosophy 
is the most general forum of debate on fundamentals, descriptive as well as prescriptive” (155). 
Naess created the philosophical foundation of Deep Ecology, and he was effective in establishing 
a forum of debate. But, Naess’ goal for Deep Ecology was also to move past philosophy into an 
environmental social movement, and he was unwilling to make rhetorically strategic decisions to 
help catalyze the movement. By not engaging specific steps to remediate the environmental 
issues of the day, or appointing another leader to establish a more concrete ecophilosophical 
platform for the movement, the productive conversations of Deep Ecology were mirrored in the 
world with exponential human population growth, and dramatic increases in industrialization, 
which led to a substantial increase of environmental degradation.  
 
Vague 	
  Articulation 	
  of 	
  Deep 	
  Ecology 	
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Naess initially began his Deep Ecological philosophical inquiry in 1973 by diagnosing 
two competing visions of ecological thought in “The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range 
Ecology Movements: A Summary.” Naess outlined the shallow ecology movement as a fight 
“against pollution and resource depletion. Central objective: the health and affluence of people in 
the developed countries” (151). Naess believed shallow ecology had driven the early ecological 
movement, and it was unhealthy, and unsustainable, because it did not address core human value 
systems. The shallow movement was reactive to human-caused environmental degradation 
instead of proactive in finding preemptive and comprehensive solutions. A deeper engagement 
with ecological thought was needed, and Naess presented his case for “The Deep Ecology 
movement” (151) in eight tenets later refined and codified with George Sessions. Naess and 
Sessions formally presented the updated theory of “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some 
Philosophical Aspects” in 1984 because the “time [was] ripe for professional ecologists to break 
their silence and express their deepest concerns more freely” (67). Naess reintroduced Deep 
Ecology to concerned scientists and philosophers partially because Sessions acted as a helpful 
liaison to an American audience for the Norwegian philosopher but also because Naess had made 
strategic changes to the language of his theory to be more inclusive to a wider audience.  
In the original 1973 introduction to Deep Ecology, the tenets were given explicit titles, 
such as: 1) biospherical egalitarianism, 2) anti-class posture, 3) local autonomy, and 4) 
decentralization. In the later Naess and Sessions tenets of Deep Ecology, the titles were removed 
intentionally to make the explicit, and controversial, goals of the tenets more palatable through 
open language. The eight tenets are as follows: 
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1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have 
value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are 
independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values 
and are also values in themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy 
vital needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial 
decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a 
smaller human population. 
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the 
situation is rapidly worsening. 
6. Policies must therefore be changed. The changes in policies affect basic 
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs 
will be deeply different from the present. 
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in 
situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher 
standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between 
bigness and greatness. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or 
indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes. (68) 
The problem diagnosed by Deep Ecology’s tenets is an anthropocentric ethic, which privileges 
human issues, and serves to primarily degrade the more-than-human world. The first of the eight 
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tenets intended to cause a dramatic shift in human engagement with the more-than-human 
because it replaced anthropocentrism with ecocentrism by removing the human from 
environmental centrality. Such a dramatic human reorientation was controversial because 
removing human significance undermines all human systems the privilege human success over 
any other member of the more-than-human world. Naess understood that an biospherically 
egalitarian orientation would be difficult for many humans to wholeheartedly agree with because 
it would mean real changes to the ways humans lived, so he used more ambiguous language to 
avoid an explicit plea for biospherical egalitarianism. 
To move Naess’ rhetoric from framing his first point under the explicit title of 
biospherical egalitarianism in his 1973 paper, to his paper in 1984 proposing intrinsic value, was 
a more palatable shift for a wider audience. Naess was still trying to coax ecocentric sensibility 
from his audience with the eight tenets, but he slowly built his ecocentric argument throughout 
his paper. Right after introducing the eight tenets, Naess described the logic of each tenet in more 
detail. For tenet one, Naess explained how his “formulation refers to the biosphere, or more 
professionally, to the ecosphere as a whole (this is also referred to as ‘ecocentrism’)” (68). Even 
though Naess drafted the eight tenets as more agreeable, he never changed the fundamental 
goals, or even softened the language of the fine print. The shift from systems of human 
domination or stewardship, to a system recognizing the complicated nature of the world, and 
reorienting from an anthropocentric viewpoint in favor of an ecocentric viewpoint, was still 
proposed, and was still revolutionary. But, Naess’ decision to use more open language, and his 
less than forceful prescription, left little for a social Deep Ecology movement to rally around. 
Throughout his career, Naess wrote many defenses of, and meditations on, the original 
outline of Deep Ecology. Naess even felt compelled to address the vague nature of his language: 
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“Where is the essence or core? Is there a definite general philosophy of deep ecology, or at least 
a kind of philosophy? Or is it essentially a movement with exasperatingly vague outlines?” 
(“Basics” 105). Naess embraced the vague language because he believed it encouraged and 
fostered involvement from a broad spectrum of thinkers in utilizing Deep Ecology: “Supporters 
of deep ecology may have difficulties in understanding each other’s ultimate view, but not sets of 
penultimate views as formulated as a kind of platform they have largely in common” (“Basics” 
106). Naess’ defense of a vague philosophy shows he intended to be more inclusive of different 
voices and perspectives because he believed the movement would need a large audience to have 
a sizeable social impact.  
Naess was aware of potential criticisms to Deep Ecology, and he worked to avoid and 
subdue any legitimate criticism where possible because he believed Deep Ecology could 
transcend basic, or superficial, disagreements. So, Naess’ strategy of using intentionally vague 
language was also designed to give space for argumentation and disagreement with the different 
tenets. Naess believed some may reject Deep Ecology on one tenet and therefore discount Deep 
Ecology as a whole: “This might result because they are followers of a shallow (or reform) 
environmental movement or rather they may simply dislike one or more of the eight points for 
semantical or other reasons” (68). Simple semantic disagreements were no issue for Naess, as 
long as there was a general agreement: “[Those who disagree] may well accept a different set of 
points which, to me, has roughly the same meaning, in which case I shall call them supporters of 
the deep ecology movement, but add that they think they disagree” (68). Naess’ vague language 
strategically functioned to protect the potential Deep Ecologist from being alienated prematurely 
by the overall philosophy because Naess believed his philosophy could overcome seemingly 
superficial disagreements.  
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Deep Ecological theory was captivating to many prominent theorists and thinkers of the 
time who engaged with Deep Ecology and put forth their own visions of a Deep Ecological 
future. And as a pure philosophy, Deep Ecology would be strengthened by different perspectives 
and healthy disagreement. However, without Naess either establishing his own strategic vision 
for the movement, or authorizing another Deep Ecologist’s strategic vision for a future social 
movement, the diversity of voices and ideas, and the ability of those voices to rationalize vastly 
different meanings from the tenets, resulted in a divided and ineffective movement. 
 
 
Defense 	
  of 	
  Deep 	
  Ecology 	
  
Naess’ lack of a defined strategic plan caused the movement to suffer when addressing 
important critiques of Deep Ecology. Many critics were not opposed to the aims of Deep 
Ecology but wanted to address the real anthropocentric obstacles, such as the hierarchical social 
systems (e.g. capitalism, patriarchy) that subjugate humans and the more-than-human world, that 
stood in the way of achieving biospherical egalitarianism. Naess needed to create a more defined 
blueprint and engage critical voices to help revise and build a unified vision of Deep Ecology 
congruent with other disciplines. Instead, Naess only addressed criticism in broad, and vague, 
theoretical terms, or would utilize his own philosophical framework to render criticism 
technically incompatible with his theory, and therefore irrelevant to Naess. Naess’ philosophical 
framework is best shown through his own Apron diagram: 
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                                            (“The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects” 77)	  
	  
The Apron diagram contains “four levels: (1) verbalized fundamental philosophical and religious 
views, (2) the deep ecology platform, (3) the more or less general consequences derived from the 
platform—guidelines for lifestyles and for policies of every kind, and (4) prescriptions related to 
concrete situations” (“Basics” 106). Naess created the Apron diagram to help Deep Ecologists 
move their questioning from the superficial issues (3 & 4), to engage in argumentation that 
accesses ultimate, fundamental value systems (1), through the eight points of Deep Ecology (2): 
“One main point in deep ecology is the deep argumentation, that is, argumentation from ultimate 
(philosophical, religious) premises, but there is room for very different sets of such premises” 
(“Basics” 108). The Apron diagram accompanied Naess’ inclusive philosophy, and went even 
further in establishing a framework to legitimize differences in opinion as philosophically 
compatible.  
Naess had many goals with the Apron diagram. Naess’ first goal was to make the 
philosophical aspects more concrete, and maintain an inclusive message to people who have 
different, and seemingly incompatible, beliefs: “Deep ecology as a conviction, with its 
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subsequently derived practical recommendations, can follow from a number of more 
comprehensive world views” (79). The second goal for Naess was to help give structure to a 
deeper line of questioning because “The decisive difference between a shallow and deep 
ecology, in practice, concerns the willingness to question, and an appreciation of the importance 
of questioning … It asks “why” insistently and consistently, taking nothing for granted!” (75). 
Naess wanted Deep Ecology to get to the fundamental value systems that shaped human relations 
to the more-than-human, and the philosophical framework enabled his own ability to question, 
but he also helped other Deep Ecologists push their own lines of inquiry deeper. 
In “The Deep Ecological Movement,” Naess demonstrated how the Apron diagram is 
designed to bring ostensibly disparate ultimate premises to work together and result in a more 
cohesive social movement. Naess’ demonstration explains why Naess didn’t believe he needed 
to dictate the terms of a Deep Ecological social movement. Naess used his own personal 
ecological philosophy “Ecosophy T” for the demonstration, where his ultimate premise was 
“Self-realization” (80), instead of another religious or philosophical ultimate premise. Naess 
applied his notion of self-realization (level 1) to the Apron diagram through each of the eight 
tenets of Deep Ecology (level 2) to derive meaning from each tenet, and he argued that “a 
philosophy as a world view inevitably has implications for practical situations … Like other 
ecosophies, Ecosophy T therefore moves on … to the concrete questions of lifestyles” (81). Deep 
Ecologists did not need to agree on ultimate premises, and they would find their own personal 
solutions to issues that would arise from engaging level two, so Naess didn’t want to push or 
enforce any official doctrine. Naess’ Apron diagram functions logically and is informative, but 
his system did little to unite and push a movement towards change. 
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The third goal for Naess was to utilize the Apron diagram to address criticisms of Deep 
Ecology. Naess was sure of the strength of his theory, and he believed “It is of considerable 
importance that the Deep Ecology movement has so far faced no serious philosophically-based 
criticism. Sooner or later that will occur, but of course it has to be legitimate criticism, not a 
caricature, of the movement” (“Deepness” 211). Naess was happy to set a high bar and 
discourage any superficial criticism of Deep Ecology. But, Naess was also protective, and so 
caught up with the legitimacy of Deep Ecology as a sound philosophy that he rarely brought up 
direct criticisms when they were lodged against his theory. When Naess did address criticism, he 
would utilize the logical framework of the Apron diagram to disprove or discount it as a logical 
flaw of the individual critiquing Deep Ecology; therefore, in Naess’ mind, the criticism wouldn’t 
need further exploration or remediation, as he showed in his rebuttal to ecofeminist critiques. 
Carolyn Merchant summarized a few different criticisms of Deep Ecology in her book 
Radical Ecology: The Search for a Living World. The most compelling criticism she engaged 
was from the Ariel Kay Salleh of the ecofeminist community. Salleh was concerned how Naess 
“and other deep ecologists fail to see the historical and philosophical connections between the 
domination of nature by ‘man’ and the domination of women by men” (104). Salleh’s concern 
was valid because Naess had presented this new radical theoretical framework, yet there was no 
mention of radically reorienting man’s relationship to women. Naess’s intentionally vague 
construction of Deep Ecology gave a lot room for personal interpretation, and that meant Deep 
Ecology could be construed for altruistic purposes, but also could be interpreted to legitimize 
continued subordination of women, which ecofeminists were wary of. Naess did call for policies 
to be changed in economic, technological, and ideological structures, but “The ‘anti-class’ 
posture offered by Naess is superficial, ignoring the connection between nature as commodity 
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and woman as commodity in patriarchal society” (104). Naess didn’t explicitly call for the 
breakdown of any social, patriarchal, or capitalistic systems—and without clear language on the 
terms of a new orientation within such systems—ecofeminists wouldn’t accept Deep Ecology. 
Merchant asked: “Could deep ecology be cured of its antifeminist bias through greater sensitivity 
to its own language and analysis? The answer is no” (104-5). The people of the ecofeminist 
movement understood how both patriarchal and capitalistic societies dominate, and objectify, 
women. Therefore, ecofeminist acceptance of Deep Ecology was fundamentally weak and would 
not improve unless Naess himself were willing to properly address a concrete strategy, not just 
show greater sensitivity to language and analysis, to dismantle foundational systems that 
subordinate women. 
Naess understood the criticisms of Deep Ecology but didn’t want to move outside of the 
framework of his philosophy. Instead of taking ecofeminist criticism and trying to create a more 
nuanced Deep Ecological plan, Naess further alienated his potential allies by only addressing 
ecofeminist critiques through the Apron diagram’s philosophical logic: “For example, if by 
ecofeminism you mean that the ecological crisis is essentially due to the domination of sorts of 
masculine-value priorities, this can be articulated on level 3. The strategy of overcoming the 
crisis, [is] the level 4 decision” (“Basics” 118). So, for ecofeminism, there may be disagreements 
with the consequences, guidelines and prescriptions from levels 3 and 4 of Deep Ecology, but the 
deeper, more fundamental engagement with Deep Ecology can remain intact and inclusive. 
Naess believed “The shallow or reform movement tends to argue only on level 3 and level 4” 
(“Basics” 119), and most people who agree with the tenets of Deep Ecology should not dismiss it 
for issues on more superficial results of current societal orientations. Naess only addressed 
counter-arguments within his own logical framework, and his logic is sound. However, Naess’ 
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choice to transcend logical anthropocentric issues with Deep Ecological theory frustrated 
potential allies of the movement by only focusing on the ways criticisms are superficial to Deep 
Ecology’s ultimate purpose.  
 
 
Deep 	
  Ecological 	
  Revisions 	
  
Naess didn’t set a strategic vision for the Deep Ecology movement; instead, he tried to 
reinforce large scale buy-in by defending and trying to explain away perceived issues with the 
theory because he believed “Closely similar or even identical conclusions may be drawn from 
divergent or even incompatible premises” (“Basics” 106). Naess initially had confidence in 
people overcoming different viewpoints because different value systems could be reconciled as 
long as people could mostly agree to some version of the eight tenets of level two of his Apron 
diagram. But within a few years, Naess wasn’t as confident in the strength of his theory bringing 
distant voices together and recognized how the ambiguous nature of Deep Ecology could “be felt 
by some to be bewildering and makes deep ecology too vague to deserve analytical scrutiny” 
(“Basics” 106). So, Naess acknowledged the strategic weakeness of employing vague language 
in his 1984 version of his tenets, and he began publishing works to adjudicate meaning of some 
of his more vague and troubled concepts.  
Naess began to bring clarity to Deep Ecology, and his mode was to address his rhetoric. 
Naess wanted to address how “In recent years considerable efforts have been made to distinguish 
two concepts; one is expressed by the term ‘intrinsic value’ and the other by the term ‘inherent 
value’ or ‘inherent worth.’ What I intend to express by the use of the term ‘intrinsic value’ in the 
Eight Points is perhaps better conveyed by the term ‘inherent value’” (216). The change is small, 
but Naess addressing his rhetoric signified his recognition of the limitations of vague language, 
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since he had previously dismissed parsing semantics as necessary. Naess did take some positive 
steps to address and correct some ambiguous language that created disagreement; but in many of 
the instances where Naess chose to address issues with the movement, he ultimately served to 
further complicate issues with more vague language. 
Parsing the intended meaning of inherent versus intrinsic value was an attempt by Naess 
to clarify a position, but the resulting change for Deep Ecology was barely noticeable. One of 
Naess’ more important attempts to intervene with his rhetoric was in revisiting his controversial 
use of “the term ‘vital needs,’ … [because] what you need in your life is a small fraction of what 
you are led to desire in the rich countries whereas, in regions of desperate poverty, the vital 
needs of the majority of people are not satisfied whether or not they reduce the richness and 
diversity of life forms” (217). Naess was smart to try and address the trouble with potential 
definitions of “vital needs,” but even his revision of “vital needs” is noncommittal and vague. 
Naess consciously utilized “vital needs” in an attempt to appeal to people with different value 
systems, but “vital needs” can be manipulated to rationalize many counter-productive actions to 
ideal Deep Ecological practices. For people in the developed world, a perceived “vital need” 
could be keeping multiple cars for a small family because each parent has a busy schedule and 
works on opposite sides of town. What about privileging bicycles, or walking, and embracing a 
slower pace once you have shed a consumer and capitalist lifestyle? The notion of vitality, at 
least for the developed world, should have been codified by Naess so other Deep Ecologists 
would have a unified notion of how to go forward as a movement, or at least have an opportunity 
to argue against a reasonable “vital needs” goal in an effort to create a better definition. 
Naess also subsequently tried to re-engage and revise the eight points with a more 
comprehensive list in “Deep Ecology and Lifestyle” to alleviate criticism and establish a more 
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solid foundation for engaging Deep Ecology. But Naess never lost his ambivalence over creating 
a more concrete blueprint for Deep Ecologists because he thought it “would be practically 
impossible to formulate precise criteria for a consistent Deep Ecology lifestyle. Every 
formulation would have to be vague and highly dependent upon terminological idiosyncrasies” 
(259). It was a good move for Naess to recognize the difficulty of creating universal guidelines 
for Deep Ecological engagement, but he could have at least given a more concrete outline to the 
developed world, which perhaps could have been adapted to other countries/cultures in some 
measure.  
In Naess’ expanded twenty-five-point list in “Deep Ecology and Lifestyle,” his attempt to 
create a more concrete blueprint for Deep Ecological engagement is rife with vague examples, 
but one of his most troubling points is “8. Concern about the situation of the Third and Fourth 
Worlds and the attempt to avoid a material standard of living too much different from and higher 
than the needy (global solidarity of lifestyle)” (260). What does “global solidarity of lifestyle” 
mean? How would that be implemented in the developed world? To ask for global solidarity of 
lifestyle is easy, but it doesn’t necessarily push people to action. Naess doesn’t tell potential 
Deep Ecologists to stop buying imported goods, or to sell their houses and send superfluous 
goods to those in the developing world who would benefit. Naess doesn’t tell Deep Ecologists 
that they only need one or two changes of clothes, and the rest is wasteful. Or, to stop buying 
goods outside of food, until local farming becomes sustainable, in an effort to dismantle 
capitalism. Naess had many opportunities to give Deep Ecologists a tangible plan for moving 
towards a more biospherical egalitarian world but didn’t want to alienate any potential Deep 
Ecologists. 
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Not all of Naess’ points lack any concrete blueprint for engagement, but the elements that 
do propose more concrete ideas are unreasonable and useless because they are from such a 
distinct world of privilege: “11. To appreciate and choose, whenever possible, meaningful work 
rather than just making a living” (260). How many people are able to make a choice to do 
meaningful work over just making a living? Number eleven gives a privileged notion of the 
human condition in developed societies, but Naess goes further: “15. Efforts to satisfy vital needs 
rather than desires. Resisting the urge to ‘go shopping’ as a diversion or therapy. Reducing the 
sheer number of possessions, favoring the old, much-worn, but essentially well-kept things” 
(260). Naess seems to be writing in a utopian world already transformed by Deep Ecology, not 
trying to convince people they need to enact dramatic shifts in orientation and consciousness. 
Naess wants people to value their grandfather’s chair they inherited over a more stylish IKEA 
option. Naess’ final point is very loose in its potential interpretations: “25. Vegetarianism, total 
or partial” (261). Naess wanted people to not eat meat, or, well, at least, eat less meat. So, stop 
eating meat, unless you still want to, but maybe a little less? In later iterations of Naess’ list of 
Deep Ecology’s lifestyle guideline, he finally changes number twenty-five to just 
“Vegetarianism,” which is necessary for a true Deep Ecological vision, but his lack of 
willingness to show concise leadership, through examples, was too damaging to Deep Ecology’s 
ability to flourish as a movement. 
Naess even knew his lack of tangible planning had a profound effect on the reception of 
Deep Ecology, and he wanted to push back: “Critics have deplored the lack of an authoritative 
Deep Ecology blueprint … Visions are needed, but scarcely blueprints” (220). Naess provided 
the vision and the framework, but was unwilling to give any practical blueprint for fear of 
fracturing Deep Ecology. But, Naess’ apprehensiveness to apply Deep Ecology to real-life 
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situations was his most disruptive and ineffective tendency. Naess didn’t often try to engage 
ways of implementing theory because he believed his involvement would weaken broad 
engagement and acceptance. For Naess, it was one thing to propose that the world would be 
healthier if there was a smaller population but a much more alienating conversation to actually 
try and outline such a drastic proposition.  
Other Deep Ecological thinkers, like Gary Snyder, grappled with tangible approaches to 
population issues. One example is when Snyder wrote in his essay, “Four Changes,” that 
humanity needed to “Demand immediate participation by all countries in programs to legalize 
abortion, encourage vasectomy and sterilization … try to correct traditional cultural attitudes that 
tend to force women into child-bearing” (142), and he didn’t stop there. Snyder’s solution was 
dramatic, and it came into conflict with some of Deep Ecology’s fundamental values, such as 
cultural respect, because he wanted to impose new cultural norms for humanity. However, 
Snyder pushed against the status quo of rampant population growth because a sustainable human 
population is critically important to a Deep Ecological biospherical egalitarian future. Snyder 
made a difficult and controversial argument, but his solution is at least an actual proposed 
solution, and one that could be argued, and refined.  
Naess, when actually wading into practical applications of Deep Ecology, was plagued by 
an unwillingness to make hard choices. Naess’ subsequent, more concrete approach to 
population reduction is summed up as “It is recognized that excessive pressures on planetary life 
stem from the human population explosion. The pressure stemming from the industrial societies 
is a major factor, and population reduction must have the highest priority in those societies” 
(“The Deep Ecological Movement” 73). Naess’ own proposal for reduction in population is 
spelled out in very broad and noncommittal terms. First, Naess talks about a need for people in 
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rich countries to address population growth because the movement “cannot expect people in the 
poorer countries to believe in this point if very few people in the richest countries do” 
(“Revisited” 218). Fair point, but Naess doesn’t propose specifics on how to accomplish the task. 
Then, in his discussion of the developing world, Naess talks about how fewer children would 
mean more available resources. But how many fewer children would constitute the necessary 
change? Also, communities could adopt a more altruistic ethic of care with fewer children acting 
as a collective to help larger numbers of the elderly, eliminating the need for excess children to 
act as a social security plan. Naess not only could have put forth tangible plans to reduce 
population, but he also had real examples to help guide his policy. Naess could have championed 
China’s one child policy that was implemented in 1979 as a model for at least the developed 
world to adhere to. In the end, Naess’ proposals for population reduction aren’t bad, or 
misguided, but his proposals aren’t pushing Deep Ecologists to make the difficult decisions 
necessary to change the world.  
Naess knew he presented nothing revolutionary, or strategically effective, in his 
engagement with population reduction, and so he overcompensated by touting the amount of 
space on a page he devoted to the topic:  
I have spent so much space talking about the population issue because I think that, 
in some countries, now is the time to reconsider the design of cities, and policies 
of spacing, so as to anticipate the slow decrease of population which may begin in 
the near future in some countries; say, within a couple of generations, or even 
sooner. (“Revisited” 219) 
Naess has devoted so much time to a broad strokes vision of what population reduction would 
potentially look like… in the future some time… maybe a long time… but also maybe not so 
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long. Naess was unwilling to address tangible plans to bring about a Deep Ecological future, and 
his engagement, though instructive, did little to encourage his social movement to act. 
 Many critics, such as Murray Bookchin, interpreted Deep Ecology as misanthropic. But, 
instead of utilizing more concrete details to engage why Deep Ecology was not actually 
misanthropic, Naess chose to address misanthropy with more vague statements: “What we look 
for is not a shift of care from humans toward nonhumans, but an extension and a deepening of 
care” (“22nd Century” 311). Naess was proposing an authentic extension and deepening of care, 
but without explicitly addressing criticism with tangible solutions, critics would not be appeased. 
Snyder’s “Four Changes” solution is more directly defensible to criticism like Bookchin’s 
because, though harsh in the short-term, his plan can be argued for not being misanthropic in the 
long-term because the result could be a more sustainable, and prosperous human population. 
 
Unauthorized 	
  Outsourcing 	
  
 Deep Ecological philosophy is difficult to reconcile with a world where existing power 
structures dominate, which is why Deep Ecology wanted to be so radical in eliminating 
hierarchies through human ethical reorientation. However, Naess’ absence of functional 
leadership deferred a lot of strategic implications to other Deep Ecological thinkers, like 
Warwick Fox in his essay, “The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels.” Other 
critical discourses may have had a lot in common with Deep Ecology, but many had a difficult 
time embracing it because an immediate shift to biospherical egalitarianism could mean a lack of 
accountability for Men, Whites, Westerners, Northerners, and so on. So, when ecofeminists 
asserted that Deep Ecology was ignoring the androcentric nature of human issues because “men 
have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction than women” (275), Fox 
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worked to include their critique, and he did the work to explain why ecofeminists and Deep 
Ecologists needed to work together. Fox recognized critical concerns but believed many 
criticisms were an opportunity to embrace other discourses because “deep ecologists also agree 
with similar charges derived from other social perspectives: for example, that capitalists, whites, 
and Westerners have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction” (275). 
For Fox, Deep Ecology agreed with ecofeminist critiques, and believed transcending human-
based critical perspectives would result in “dismantling anthropocentrism” (275). Criticism of 
Deep Ecology was typically based on anthropocentric issues and instead of addressing 
anthropocentric issues of hierarchical subordination, Fox’s defense highlighted how Deep 
Ecology worked to transcend anthropocentrism.  
Fox appropriately argued that Deep Ecology works on a deeper, more foundational, 
philosophical plane, and that “Deep ecologists are not primarily concerned with exposing the 
classes of social factors historically most responsible for social domination and ecological 
destruction … [but rather] exposing the most fundamental kind of legitimation that they have 
habitually employed” (283). Deep Ecology wanted to focus on fundamental questions but also 
didn’t want to alienate other critical discourses because “ecofeminists, green socialists, and so on 
are also concerned with these questions in a different sense than deep ecologists” (283). Fox 
rhetorically transcended criticism of Deep Ecology by valuing and legitimizing other critical 
discourses “different sense” of fundamental questions, and then explaining how Deep Ecology 
went further and should be supported. Deep Ecology did present an egalitarian ideal that many 
potential followers, and critics, were able to agree with. But, Naess never properly addressed 
tangible steps toward dismantling the subordinating hierarchical systems, and though Fox 
engaged and explained the ultimate position of Deep Ecologists effectively, without any 
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authority to propose a concrete plan to dismantle hierarchies, the ecofeminists and other 
constituencies understandably continued to be critical and suspicious. 
Early in Fox’s argument, he falls into the same trap of ambiguity that plagued Naess: “it 
must be remembered that deep ecologists are not intending to advocate a specific set of 
guidelines for action; they are only intending to advocate a general orientation” (270). The 
reason Deep Ecology never gained any real traction as a movement is the same reason it won’t 
die off due to criticism: It is too vague and noncommittal. There are so few footholds in the 
language of Deep Ecological theory, and Naess’ subsequent defenses, that it cannot be properly 
utilized as a catalyzing agent for a forceful social movement. 
 
 
Another 	
  Perspective 	
  
Twelve years after Deep Ecology was formally introduced to ecocritical thinkers, Jack 
Turner, in his book: The Abstract Wild, moved beyond any sort of philosophical charge against 
Deep Ecology, and engaged how ineffective the theory is in practice: “Effective protests are 
grounded in an alternative vision. Unfortunately, we have no coherent vision of an alternative to 
our present maladies. Deep ecology does not, as yet, offer a coherent vision” (23). Deep Ecology 
presented an alternative vision, but the vision is so vague and ambiguous that it offered nothing 
to create effective protest or action. Deep Ecology is a “hodgepodge of lists, principles, 
declarations, quotations, clippings from every conceivable tradition, and tidbits of New Age 
kitsch” (23). The reason there is no clear message from Deep Ecology is because there are no 
clear proposals for change. Naess had many opportunities to propose tangible solutions, or utilize 
the solutions presented by other Deep Ecologists to catalyze the movement towards 
environmental change, but Naess only wanted to argue validity of his philosophical framework. 
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The philosophical landscape was filled with many Deep Ecological writers and thinkers 
proposing unauthorized solutions, and the result was an ineffective and fractured movement: 
“The authors do not clearly say what they mean, they do not forcefully argue for what they 
believe, they do not create anything new” (Turner 23-4). Without a figure to properly exemplify 
Deep Ecology, the numerous ideas did little to spur change: “Presented as revolutionary tracts 
aimed at subverting Western civilization, these writings on deep ecology should embarrass us 
with their intellectual timidity” (Turner 24). The theory is toothless without real proposals 
moving Deep Ecology towards real change. 
Turner’s final thought on Deep Ecology is the most damning to Naess’ development and 
engagement in fostering the theory: “Deep ecology is suspicious. It lacks passion, an absence 
that is acutely disturbing given our current state of affairs” (24). To empower a population to 
make difficult decisions, and truly make the changes necessary to transition to an ecocentric 
world, is impossible without a concrete strategy for change, and thirty-four years after the 
introduction of Deep Ecology, due to issues with climate and population growth, making 
difficult decisions more important than ever. Deep Ecology’s philosophical framework is in no 
danger of being disturbed or degraded because of Naess, but what good is a theory proposing a 
dramatic reorientation of fundamental values if it doesn’t prompt one to action? 
As I have demonstrated throughout Naess’ philosophy, there are two major reasons why 
Deep Ecology has been largely ineffective as a social movement. Naess’ rhetorical failure is the 
first issue inhibiting Deep Ecology. Rhetorical theory going back to Cicero established three 
offices of oratory. James Burnette Eskridge describes Cicero’s three offices as  
(1) to instruct [docere]; (2) to please [delectare]; (3) to move [movere]; and their 
natural and legitimate spheres of action are in the regions, (1) of the intellect; (2) 
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of the sensibilities; (3) of the will, respectively. To instruct is of the intellect, to 
arouse or soothe the emotions, to move the will is the orator’s part of the program 
in dealing with humanity. (16) 
Naess didn’t create Deep Ecology to simply add to an academic philosophical dialogue; Naess 
wanted to move humans to fundamentally change the way they engaged with the more-than-
human world. Naess’ creation of Deep Ecology, and his philosophical framework gave a logical 
and instructive path for Deep Ecologists to follow on their own journey towards a more 
ecocentric existence, but any philosophy needs to be more than just instructive if the goal is to 
become a forceful social movement.  
Cicero believed “that the principal point an orator ought to aim at, is to persuade” (67). 
Cicero also believed that “the prudence and abilities of an accomplished orator, rests not only his 
own dignity, but the welfare of individuals without number, and even whole communities” 
(Cicero 21). Naess took on a rhetorical responsibility by claiming a larger social movement 
would grow out of Deep Ecological philosophy, but Naess was unwilling to take the necessary 
rhetorical steps to move his audience towards action because a) he thought any controversial 
claims would potentially critically limit Deep Ecological involvement, and b) because the 
process of engaging with Deep Ecology would result in a more “organic” movement towards 
biospherical egalitarianism. Naess had many opportunities to use his platform to move Deep 
Ecologists towards substantive changes to alter the way they lived, whether through addressing 
and identifying tangible solutions to the criticisms lodged against Deep Ecology, or being more 
explicit in proposing concrete solutions to the problems he diagnosed. Naess was right to try and 
respect different perspectives and cultures, but it is possible to respect difference while also 
proposing concrete actions because taking action was also an equally important goal.  
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The second reason Deep Ecology failed to coalesce as a social movement was because 
Naess’ tenets were incompatible in critical places. Respecting a pure intrinsic value theory in a 
system that also privileges a human’s right to satisfy vital needs, or the implementation of 
intrinsic value without explicitly dismantling human hierarchical social systems would be 
impossible. Warwick Fox was one of the major proponents of Deep Ecology who worked to 
remove complications and incompatibilities of the theory in his book Toward a Transpersonal 
Ecology. Fox’s purpose in examining and dissecting the faults of Deep Ecology was to create a 
new ecophilosophy devoid of Deep Ecology’s rhetorical issues.  
Fox described Naess as “the bearer of so many perspectives that it would simply be 
impossible for him to be able to maintain them all at the same time without cutting the odd 
logical corner or engaging in a bit of plain bluffing” (89). Not only did Naess cut logical corners, 
but Fox also addressed potential practical incompatibilities with implementing Deep Ecological 
tenets since the “abundance of evidence to suggest that people do in fact draw upon basic 
philosophical and religious assumptions [level 1] to justify both ecocentric and anthropocentric 
views” (142). Naess wanted to be inclusive of a variety of viewpoints, but his strategy was not 
logically (or ecocentrically) coherent. It is impossible for a follower of Deep Ecology to fully 
respect intrinsic value and still prioritize “vital needs” in a fully compatible fashion. If a follower 
of Deep Ecology holds the ultimate religious premise to obey God, then the connotation, through 
interpretation of biblical text, would lead to that person privileging his/her own existence over 
other entities in the biosphere1. One of Fox’s rhetorical proposals was to change from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Fox methodically breaks down this scenario in “The ‘Fundamental’ Problem” section starting 
on p.131 in Toward a Transpersonal Ecology 
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dichotomy of shallow and deep ecology movements in favor of the “anthropocentric ecology 
movement and the ecocentric ecology movement” (144). Utilizing more explicit appeals to 
encourage the development of an ecocentric viewpoint is only one of the many issues Fox 
addressed in Transpersonal Ecology. Fox diagnosed, and logically worked through, many of 
Deep Ecology’s other issues in his book, but he was mainly interested in discussing philosophy 
and not the efficacy of Naess’ rhetoric in establishing a social movement towards change. A 
person who adheres to Deep Ecology cannot do so faithfully to all the tenets which leaves 
writers, theorists, and activists, conflicted since they are only able to exhibit some Deep 
Ecological tendencies in their work. 
 
 
Moving 	
  Forward 	
  
Though Deep Ecology has had a difficult past, the movement still has a lot of potential to 
help reorient the way humans exist with the more-than-human world, but the Deep Ecology of 
Naess is ill-equipped to move others to action. More modern environmental theories have 
emerged and have begun to move in different directions, in the aftermath of Deep Ecology’s 
stagnation as a theory; and in the case of The Dark Mountain Project, they have championed the 
poetry of Robinson Jeffers, his ethic of inhumanism, and his choice to exist outside of 
civilization, as a template to reconnect with more-than-human beauty and find productive ways 
of pursuing social and environmental justice in the face of environmental catastrophe. But, as I 
will demonstrate in chapter two, utilizing Jeffers is also rhetorically misguided because Jeffers 
had little faith in human nature, and even less interest in being the literary model of any human 
social movement. In chapter three, I propose John Steinbeck as an intellectual godfather of a 
more pragmatic Deep Ecology movement because Steinbeck developed and expressed many 
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Deep Ecological characteristics throughout his life, but he also worked to confront the ways 
capitalism served to undermine healthy human engagement within human society and with the 
more-than-human world, and he was intentionally more forceful in rhetorically motivating his 
audiences to address the issues he diagnosed. 
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Taylor Hastings 
Thesis Chapter 2 
Spring 2018 
Don’t Go to the Dark Mountain 
The human race will cease after a while and leave no trace, but the great splendors of 
nature will go on. (Jeffers, “To the American Humanist Association” 201) 
 
The whole human race ought to be scrapped and is / on the way to it; ground like fish-
meal for soil- / food. (Jeffers, The Double Axe 72) 
 
On July 24th, 2017, Brian Calvert published the essay: “Down the Dark Mountain: Can a 
forgotten California poet guide us through the ecocide?” in the magazine High Country News. 
The Dark Mountain Project was established twenty-four years after Deep Ecology, and shortly 
after, and partially in response to, the 2008 global financial crisis. The founders of Dark 
Mountain, Dougald Hine and Paul Kingsnorth, called out to all demoralized, exhausted, and 
jaded environmentalists through their 2009 manifesto: “Uncivilisation: The Dark Mountain 
Manifesto2.” Dark Mountain wanted environmentalists to face the facts: “We tried ruling the 
world; we tried acting as God’s steward; then we tried ushering in the human revolution … We 
failed in all of it” (20). Hine and Kingsnorth’s reference to “ushering in the human revolution” is 
a nod to the stated goal and subsequent failure of Arne Naess’ Deep Ecology movement, and the 
need to try something new. Since the failed Deep Ecology revolution, dominant human 
hierarchical systems have continued degrading the more-than-human world, and it left the Dark 
Mountain people believing that “we are doomed: even the politicians think this; even the 
environmentalists. Some of us deal with it by going shopping. Some deal with it by hoping it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  I will be using the British spelling of civilised throughout for consistency. 
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true. Some give up in despair. Some work frantically to try and fend off the coming storm” (14). 
The Dark Mountain project was created in the aftermath of the failed Deep Ecological 
environmental movement to ask: what can humanity do besides giving in to desperation, or 
shopping, in the age of ecocide? 
Calvert’s article defines the ecocide as “the total destruction of our home … any number 
of ongoing catastrophes: mass extinction, climate chaos, flooded coasts, mega-drought; oceans 
turning to acid, permafrost to muck” (16). Facing such a dark reality, Hine and Kingsnorth’s 
manifesto proclaims that “This is the moment to ask deep questions and to ask them urgently … 
It is time to look for new paths” (21). Dark Mountain followers are to escape the trappings of 
human society, to expose the human myths that have destroyed the environment, and use their art 
to inform their path forward. The poems of Robinson Jeffers, as well as explicit gestures to 
Jeffers’ philosophical influence, are made throughout the Dark Mountain Manifesto as an 
inspiration and a potential new path to follow. Jeffers’ work is influential because of his 
inhumanist ethic: “The shifting of emphasis from man to notman … [which is for Dark 
Mountain] the aim of Uncivilised writing” (19). Jeffers’ inhumanist ethic had also endeared 
Jeffers to Deep Ecologists because it favored a shift towards a more ecocentric personal ethic. 
Hine and Kingsnorth champion the work of Jeffers because he “was writing Uncivilised verse 
seventy years before this manifesto was thought of” (18). Uncivilised art cannot be created by 
those who are complicit in perpetuating the myth of civilisation, and so the Dark Mountain 
followers “shall make the pilgrimage to [Jeffers’] Dark Mountain, to the great, immovable, 
inhuman heights which were here before us and will be here after” (21). The new paths with the 
inspiration of Jeffers is set to dismantle the myth of civilisation, but to what end? Dark Mountain 
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chose an effective instructor with a clear message in Jeffers, but his message does not align with 
Dark Mountain’s view of human nature, or forging a positive human future.  
Jeffers believed that human separation from the more-than-human world was caused by 
consciousness, and fundamentally interfered with the human ability to recognize and engage 
beauty, and the solution was to remove any hierarchical privilege from humans in favor of a 
more egalitarian sensibility to recapture an appreciation of beauty. The Dark Mountain 
Manifesto, and the eight principles of uncivilisation3 at the end of the manifesto, mirror the path 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 THE EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF UNCIVILISATION. 
1.   We live in a time of social, economic and ecological unravelling. All around us are 
signs that our whole way of living is already passing into history. We will face this 
reality honestly and learn how to live with it. 
2.   We reject the faith which holds that the converging crises of our times can be 
reduced to a set of ‘problems’ in need of technological or political ‘solutions’. 
3.   We believe that the roots of these crises lie in the stories we have been telling 
ourselves. We intend to challenge the stories which underpin our civilisation: the 
myth of progress, the myth of human centrality, and the myth of our separation from 
‘nature’. These myths are more dangerous for the fact that we have forgotten they are 
myths. 
4.   We will reassert the role of storytelling as more than mere entertainment. It is 
through stories that we weave reality. 
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Jeffers took in removing himself from civilisation and envisions a future where uncivilised 
writers are “Apart but engaged, its practitioners always willing to get their hands dirty; aware, in 
fact, that dirt is essential; that keyboards should be tapped by those with soil under their 
fingernails and wilderness in their heads” (20). Brian Calvert goes even further than Dark 
Mountain to claim that a return to connection with the more-than-human would recuperate 
beauty, but also: “the creation of beauty can come from advocates of justice. A human rights 
lawyer, a sanctuary church, protesters for women’s rights or science or both, demonstrations 
against police violence—these heal injury also, rebalance the whole, adding beauty to the world” 
(24). Both Kingsnorth and Calvert believe Jeffers’ engagement with the convalescent beauty of 
more-than-human nature is a healthy blueprint for dealing with the grief of the ecocide, and they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5.   Humans are not the point and purpose of the planet. Our art will begin with the 
attempt to step outside the human bubble. By careful attention, we will reengage with 
the non-human world. 
6.   We will celebrate writing and art which is grounded in a sense of place and of time. 
Our literature has been dominated for too long by those who inhabit the cosmopolitan 
citadels. 
7.   We will not lose ourselves in the elaboration of theories or ideologies. Our words 
will be elemental. We write with dirt under our fingernails. 
8.   The end of the world as we know it is not the end of the world full stop. Together, we 
will find the hope beyond hope, the paths which lead to the unknown world ahead of 
us. (Hine and Kingsnorth 23) 
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may not be rhetorically misguided in their use of Jeffers as an exemplary literary model if they 
only care to remove themselves from society and chastise anyone who perpetuates degrading 
human myths; but, if Calvert and Dark Mountain intend on using Jeffers to bring about any 
positive human social, or environmental, change, then Dark Mountain has chosen the wrong 
writer. Jeffers did not imagine a future world where humans exist in any positive sense. Jeffers’ 
was mainly interested in chastising humanity, and he didn’t want to lead an organized revolt 
against human civilisation, much less lead an effort to pursue human social justice. Jeffers only 
saw inhumanist beauty in his apocalyptic visions of a world devoid of humans. For Jeffers, the 
health of the more-than-human world was not dependent on humanity moving past an 
anthropocentric orientation but rather in the more-than-human world moving on from humans. 
 Dark Mountain, like Deep Ecology before it, wants humans to recognize that their actions 
have consequences and to help people come to terms and cope with their destructive systemic 
actions but also look for a more productive way forward through engaging the more-than-human 
world. Dark Mountain’s strategy for dismantling societal myths is through the creation of art, 
and their belief “that only artists can do it” (17). Following Jeffers’ literal example of moving 
away from civilisation, Dark Mountain “will collect the words and the images of those who 
consider themselves Uncivilised … who want to help us attack the citadels” (22). Uncivilised 
writing “is writing which attempts to stand outside the human bubble and see us as we are: 
highly evolved apes with an array of talents and abilities which we are unleashing without 
sufficient thought, control, compassion or intelligence” (17). The Dark Mountain project does 
not see the gentle rhetorical nudge towards ecocentrism that Deep Ecology employed as 
effective, nor does it see more practical engagements with environmentalism as being productive 
because Deep Ecology and environmentalism exist and function in the realm of civilisation.  
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Going back to rhetorical theory from the first chapter, the three aims of the orator are “(1) 
to instruct [docere]; (2) to please [delectare]; (3) to move [movere]” (Eskridge 16). Jeffers 
literally moved away from civilization, but he never rhetorically moved his audiences to action; 
instead, Jeffers used his perspective from outside human civilization to instruct humanity on the 
reality of its darker nature. The Dark Mountain Project’s goal of dismantling human myths of 
progress and civilization that have perpetuated more-than-human degradation is honorable. But, 
by pursuing the end of dismantling systemic human myths through the literary example of 
Robinson Jeffers, the Dark Mountain people have engaged in environmental activism and 
therefore can be judged on their rhetorical strategy towards environmental change.  
 Much like the failed Deep Ecology movement, the rhetorical message of Dark Mountain, 
and its ultimate goals, are ambitious, but also ambiguous. At the end of the Dark Mountain 
manifesto, they ask: “Where does it end? Nobody knows. Where will it lead? We are not sure” 
(22). The Ecocide is upon us, and humanity needs to address and pursue tangible solutions to 
environmental issues. Jeffers’ work posed a solution that was salutary for his own sanity, but 
even in the early 20th century his prescription was highly privileged and unreasonable on a 
larger scale. The appropriation of Jeffers today as a way for people to deal with the ecocide 
represents an even more privileged solution. The Dark Mountain Project’s interpretation of 
Jeffers is not intrinsically bad, and I do not mean to construe it as such, but it is misguided. To 
accept Dark Mountain’s pursuit of art to subvert societal myths, and grieve ecological disaster, is 
a band-aid for the privileged in society to mitigate guilty feelings. If society is resigned to the 
capitalistic model, as it has shown itself to be, then concerted efforts to change infrastructure to 
renewable technologies, and investment in other climate mitigation technologies, must be the 
priority. To accept and appreciate nature’s intrinsic value is needed but will not save us if we do 
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not have a clear strategic path. Jeffers should be celebrated as a great American poet, but Jeffers’ 
work does not propose a practical way forward.  
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To read Jeffers is to understand his disdain for humanity. Jeffers wanted humans to strive 
to shed their separation from the more than human world, but he didn’t believe humanity was 
capable of this; Jeffers wasn’t just disillusioned with human myths, he was disillusioned with 
human nature. In Albert Gelpi’s introduction to The Wild God of the World, he describes Jeffers’ 
religious views as a “Calvinist agnosticism: Calvinism without Christ, without God’s redemptive 
incarnation in the human condition” (9). Humanity did not represent a positive transcendence of 
the natural world, in fact “Jeffers’ reading in science and psychology confirmed his conviction 
that consciousness, which Christians like Dante and humanists like Emerson took to be the 
distinguishing and crowning glory of humans, was in fact the original sin that separated us from 
the divine processes of nature” (10-11). Jeffers’ notion of consciousness had ramifications in his 
writing. Jeffers’ issue was not with consciousness alone, but rather with “its selfishness and self-
centeredness that separates our species from the others” (Kopecký 112). In “The Answer,” 
Jeffers expresses his anguish and disgust over humanity’s conscious separation, writing: 
Integrity is wholeness,  
the greatest beauty is 
Organic wholeness, the wholeness of life and things, the divine beauty 
of the universe. Love that, not man 
Apart from that, or else you will share man's pitiful confusions, 
or drown in despair when his days darken. (Hunt 522) 
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Jeffers believed humanity’s separation from the more-than-human world through consciousness 
caused humans to be unable to appreciate beauty, and the divine beauty of the universe is one of 
wholeness. Jeffers tells us to “Love that, not man / Apart from that.” To exist in a world where 
humans are separate from the more-than-human relegates humanity to pitiful confusion and 
despair. Jeffers believed consciousness led to the proliferation of negative human qualities, and 
therefore relished living in the Tor house, a house he helped build from local granite on the 
Carmel, California coast, away from modern human civilisation. 
Jeffers’ experience building the house was influential in his engagement with deep time 
through a love of rocks and geological processes. In Jeffers’ poem “Granite and Cypress,” he 
tries to understand his limited temporal perspective in the context of his new home:  
I have 
granite and cypress, 
Both long-lasting, 
Planted in the earth; but the granite sea-bowlders [sic] are prey to no hawk’s 
wing, they have taken worse pounding, 
Like me they remember 
Old wars and are quiet; for we think that the future is one piece with the 
past, we wonder why tree-tops 
And people are so shaken. (39)  
Jeffers takes the long view. What does a few years of war mean in terms of the life of a tree, 
which can be hundreds of years? What about a piece of granite, which can exist for millions, if 
not billions of years, in the right conditions? Jeffers was comforted knowing the more-than-
human world would survive humanity, and he knew, in a geologic sense, that a war waged is no 
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more destructive than the blow from a hawk’s wing, just as the life of a tree seems fleeting when 
put into the context of deep time.  
In a letter to Sister Mary James Power in 1934, Jeffers reluctantly expressed his belief 
“that the universe is one being, all its parts are different expressions of the same energy, and they 
are all in communication with each other, influencing each other, therefore parts of one organic 
whole” (Jeffers, “Letter” 189). Jeffers’ holistic thinking was beautiful, and he tried to find 
communion with everything so he could recognize and appreciate beauty. Jeffers’ notion of 
beauty was unconventional though. In “Fire on the Hills,” Jeffers describes 
 the roaring wave of the brushfire;  
I thought of the smaller lives that were caught.  
Beauty is not always lovely; the fire was beautiful, the terror  
of the deer was beautiful. (150)  
For Jeffers, Beauty was not only expressed in aesthetically pleasing ways, but also in the raw 
power of the more-than-human world. Beauty came out of the order of, and communion with, the 
more-than-human world. In Jeffers’ poem, “Boats in a Fog,” he is able to find beauty in the 
ordinary: 
A flight of pelicans 
Is nothing lovelier to look at; 
The flight of the planets is nothing nobler; all the arts lose virtue 
Against the essential reality 
Of creatures going about their business among the equally 
Earnest elements of nature. (38) 
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Jeffers’ love of the world was simple, and he reveled in the simplicity, and universality, of 
nature. Earnest elements of nature express large and small scale beauty. Jeffers states that his art, 
and the art of any human construction, could never compare to the simple beauty of the natural 
processes, and order, of the more-than-human world.  
 
 
Cawdor 	
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Jeffers was never shy in sharing his opinions with the outside world, even when it meant 
people would attack his work to minimize his influence. William Everson wrote in the 
introduction to Cawdor that it was “enthusiastically received” (vii), and helped Jeffers to obtain 
prominence as a writer. However, the economic depression, and the second World War, followed 
his rise to fame, and “Jeffers was conscious of the change in taste but refused to conform to it. 
He also refused to celebrate the war efforts and the American patriotism … In fact, Jeffers’ 
criticism of the narcissistic human race sharpened during and after the war” (Kopecký 52). 
Jeffers was disgusted with humanity’s propensity for violence, and believed “violence was the 
human condition, the inevitable consequence of the aggressive ego aggrandized into national 
ego” (Gelpi, “Introduction” 7). Jeffers was writing from outside human civilization, much like 
the followers of Dark Mountain, but he wasn’t merely critical of societal institutions; Jeffers 
believed the human condition was aggressive, violent, and degraded. Jeffers’ anti-American 
criticism forced his work into obscurity for many years because of the backlash during the war. 
In 1992, Dana Gioia wrote that “no major American poet has been treated worse by posterity 
than Robinson Jeffers” (Tangney xiv). Jeffers’ most difficult critical reception was during World 
War II because of his anti-war rhetoric. After the war, Jeffers’ work was marginalized in 
popularity, but he continued to be a force for sharp criticism of modern human society.  
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William Everson also wrote in the Cawdor introduction that Jeffers’ intention with 
Cawdor “was to write a simple narrative, classically sound, in which his doctrine, his 
‘inhumanism,’ as he was to call it, is implicit, not obtrusive” (xiii). Jeffers was still formulating 
his inhumanist ethic, and he used Cawdor as a way of criticizing the increasingly alienated 
relationship humans had with the more-than-human world. Cawdor is a man living on the 
California coast who maintains a reciprocal relationship to the land as a farmer, and Cawdor’s 
themes closely mirror the ideals Jeffers himself held.  
Cawdor’s oldest child is Hood, a hunter, and in Cawdor’s eyes, a taker from the land. The 
story takes place years after Hood shot an eagle, and then left his family because Hood and 
Cawdor fought over Hood’s behavior. When Hood returns to his father’s land, Cawdor tells his 
daughter, Michal, that Hood will stay: “As long as you don’t ask him to work. George works, but 
[Hood] / Is only a hunter” (14). Cawdor has little respect for hunters because they do not give 
anything back to the land. Michal is tasked with rehabilitating the eagle Hood had injured, and 
she takes it upon herself to try and maintain some semblance of a natural order through trapping, 
injuring, and sacrificing squirrels to the eagle because she “can’t let him be killed. And now, day 
after day, / I have to be cruel to bring him a little happiness” (16). Cawdor, like Jeffers, has a 
belief in a natural order that results in connection and beauty, but Hood’s violation of that order 
resulted in disconnection and ugliness. 
 Jeffers uses Cawdor to highlight his issues with the modern capitalistic machine that 
worked to separate people from nature. Cawdor finds capitalistic pursuits to be troubling, and 
fruitless:  
I was brought 
up hard. I did a man’s work at twelve 
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And bossed a gang at eighteen. That gets you nowhere. I learned 
that ruling poor men’s hands is nothing, 
Ruling men’s money’s a wedge in the world. 
……………………………………. 
The trick inside it, the filthy nothing, the fooled men and rotten faces. (8-9)  
Cawdor finds no pleasure or fulfillment through ruling over other men. Cawdor sees no god in 
money. Cawdor believes taking part in the exercise leads men to be fooled, and spoiled. Jeffers, 
through Cawdor, does serve to break down the importance of money, and the way capitalism pits 
humans against each other in artificial ways that would be useful to Dark Mountain, but they 
don’t address that Jeffers wanted nothing to do with humans. 
 Dark Mountain wants humans to be humbled and there are some passages in Cawdor that 
serve their purpose. Cawdor acts as a forum for Jeffers to reckon his notions of existence and the 
relevance of human life. Jeffers alludes to the idea of deep time when discussing the land he 
farms, saying:  
“There were people 
here before us,” he said, “and others will come 
After our time. These poor flints were their knives, wherever  
you dig you find them.” (107)  
Cawdor recognizes the insignificance of his existence, and of all human existence. Not only will 
more come after Cawdor, but potentially many people, for many years. In that context, how can 
Cawdor see his life as important? Jeffers’ notion of deep time worked to humble the relevance of 
a single lifetime; but deep time, and the connection through artifacts, also harken to the universal 
nature of existence, and the deep connections as he describes “black-shouldered stone universes / 
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Of color and life” (17), highlighting and conflating tide pools and the universe. Cawdor’s 
engagement with place is holistic and reciprocal to the point that “he knew / His hills as if he had 
nerves under the grass” (23). Jeffers championed such engagement with the more-than-human, 
but he didn’t believe the separation from nature through consciousness enabled humans to 
connect with the more-than-human world in effective ways.  
 Some of Jeffers’ most interesting passages show a subtle criticism of human 
subordination of the more-than-human world. Fera, Cawdor’s young wife, is described as having 
to endure Cawdor at night “if he pleased / As this earth endures man” (20). Humanity is not a 
natural being, and the human relationship with the earth is one to be endured, not shared or 
reciprocal. Later in the story, Fera yells out:  
We have no right. The trees 
are decent, but we! A redwood cut 
To make a coffin, an oak’s roots for a grave: some 
day the coast will lose patience and dip 
And be clean. (54)  
Jeffers describes Fera’s belief of the human/nature relationship as Hood begins to cut a bough 
from a tree. Not only do humans not have the right to make earth suffer the desires of humanity, 
but the earth still holds power and can shrug off humanity when it sees fit. Jeffers believed that a 
reciprocal relationship was a natural relationship, and the domination and subordination of the 
more-than-human by humans was deplorable.  
 In Jeffers’ poem, “Carmel Point,” he is in awe of the temperament of the more-than-
human, as he exclaims: “The extraordinary patience of things!” (175). Jeffers believed “We must 
uncenter our minds from ourselves; / We must unhumanize our views a little, and become 
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confident / As the rock and ocean that we were made from” (175). Jeffers wanted humans to 
transcend fickle insecurities by reconnecting with our surrounding environments. In some 
passages of Cawdor, and Jeffers’ other poetry, Dark Mountain has a case for utilizing Jeffers as a 
literary example of their movement, but later in Jeffers’ career, he only became more 
disillusioned with humanity. 
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In 1948, Jeffers published The Double Axe and fully elucidated his ethic of inhumanism 
that became so appealing to both Deep Ecologists and the Dark Mountaineers. Jeffers, in his 
preface, believed The Double Axe’s “burden, as of some other previous work of mine, is to 
present a certain philosophical attitude, which might be called Inhumanism, a shifting of 
emphasis and significance from man to not-man; the rejection of human solipsism and 
recognition of the transhuman magnificence” (xxi). Jeffers’ inhumanism firmly aligns his 
personal philosophy with Deep Ecology and Dark Mountain because Jeffers wished for a 
transcendence from the relationship of human domination of the more-than-human, to a 
relationship of reciprocity and respect. Jeffers did not write simply as a personal cathartic 
exercise but believed his viewpoint was necessary for the rest of humanity to reckon with, and 
The Double Axe held Jeffers’ conscientious burden of chastising modern human orientations to 
the world. 
 Jeffers went further in his criticism of humanity in his preface, saying: “It seems time that 
our race began to think as an adult does, rather than like an egocentric baby or insane person. 
This manner of thought and feeling is neither misanthropic nor pessimist … It involves no 
falsehoods, and is a means of maintaining sanity in slippery times; it has objective truth and 
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human value” (xxi). Jeffers was secure in his pragmatic criticism of humanity. He saw no reason 
to be irrational; Jeffers believed humanity needed to face the objective problems created from an 
egomaniacal orientation to the more-than-human. Jeffers could not agree with, or be complicit in, 
the devaluation of human, and more-than-human, life in the 20th century. Jeffers wanted to be 
clear that his viewpoint was sane and reasonable, and that those who perpetuate war and 
alienation from the earth were headed towards destruction.  
Jeffers’ criticism was so heavy-handed that the publisher offered a disclaimer at the 
beginning of the book, establishing that “Random House feels compelled to go on record with its 
disagreement over some of the political views pronounced by the poet in this volume” (xxiii). 
Jeffers felt that humans needed a radical reorientation to the more-than-human world. Deep 
Ecology tried to be inclusive and accepting of as many viewpoints so society would gradually 
move towards a more biologically egalitarian sensibility; Jeffers decided the best way to pull 
people out of their horrific and degrading sensibility was a rhetorical slap across the face. 
 In part one of The Double Axe, “The Love and the Hate,” the main character Hoult has 
died in the war, but he is resurrected through his pain of feeling “gypped out of life, / fooled and 
despised and lied to” (7). The spectral Hoult comes home to express the full human ramifications 
of war. Hoult’s soul cannot rest, and he blames “War-peddlers’ lies and the people’s imbecility / 
That raked me out of my grave” (7). Jeffers shocked people out of complicity with war and 
destruction through Hoult. He chose to write about the result of war, which is violence and death, 
instead of writing a patriotic novel privileging an American sensibility, or discussing the merits 
of one governmental system over another. Jeffers was unwilling to move past the death and 
destruction, and he refused to rationalize such a cost for any tangible societal gain. Jeffers 
wanted people to understand the bloody ramifications of war. 
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 Hoult confronts his father who served in a previous war, asking: “Did you / And your old 
buddies decide what the war’s about? / I came to ask. You were all for it, you know; And 
keeping safe away from it” (12). War wasn’t rational to Jeffers, no matter the cost. War was a 
horrific human commodity to be sold and rationalized through degraded human systems. Jeffers 
did not agree with the acts of Hitler, or any other bellicose cruelties, but he instead saw all such 
egregious acts as deriving from the same root philosophy of human superiority. Hoult not only 
represents the costs of war but also the cruelty, when he asks his parents: “Have you ever seen a 
flame-thrower? No, I suppose, / Not in your time. We roast them, you know, screaming, / in their 
little nests. That was my occupation” (17). Jeffers made spectacle of the horrors of war. Even 
Hoult’s descriptions that dehumanize the people he was killing makes the story more troubling. 
There was no cloak of righteousness, or patriotism; righteousness and patriotism are 
rationalizations for horrific acts. Jeffers was unrelenting in his criticism of the war, and its 
rationalization, through many scenes where Hoult begs for someone to explain how war is 
justifiable. Hoult turns his begging into criticism by giving conditions for any explanation, 
telling his parents he won’t accept  
that the world 
Will be improved, or good will be earned, or peace 
Made perfect by blasting cities and nations into bloody 
choppets: if you believe that 
You’ll believe anything. (26) 
Jeffers wanted people to recognize their folly in engaging war, but more so wanted to chastise 
people for tacitly accepting these consequences, and mitigating any recognition of truth through 
cheap patriotism. Humans were arrogant and easily swayed to commit atrocities because of fear; 
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Jeffers knew people would “believe anything” that rationalized terrible behavior, and he saw that 
human relationships to the more-than-human world were just as irrational and destructive.  
 Jeffers gave more weight to Hoult’s criticism of humanity through his resurrection. Hoult 
tells his family “I am the only dead body / that has had the energy to get up again / Since Jesus 
Christ” (35). Jesus was put on earth to help people be forgiven for their sins, and Hoult is 
resurrected to hold people accountable. As a fire approaches the house, and the family is dying, 
Hoult talks of justice for those committed to war. Hoult wishes “that every man who approved 
this war, / In which we had no right, reason nor justice, / Were crawling there in the fire’s way 
with his back broken” (48). Hoult describes the punishment as a sort of justice or penance for 
misdeeds. Hoult believes humanity needs to be cleansed of such horrid behavior, and sees the 
virtue of fire, telling his family to “Look: it is God’s work: I believe in / God: he sent the fire, / 
He lined the sights” (48). Jeffers had a sense that the only way to cure the ills of humanity was 
through an apocalypse, and his criticism of humanity in The Double Axe reinforces his reasons 
for wanting an apocalyptic end. Jeffers did not hold such a pessimistic view of humanity early in 
his career, but watching human arrogance and violence in war only pushed him farther away. 
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In the end, Jeffers found no faith in humanity and concluded that “the whole human race 
ought to be scrapped and is / on the way to it; ground like fish-meal for soil- / food” (72). Jeffers 
expressed more value of the human race for enriching the soil, rather than existing as it has. 
Jeffers saw no value in the ways humans dominate, and their belief in their right to dominate. 
Part two of The Double Axe, “The Inhumanist,” follows an old caretaker of the land after the fire. 
Upon saving a drowning man, who wanted to die, the old man recognizes “‘I have acted against 
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reason / And against instinct.’ He laughed and said: ‘But that’s the condition of being human: to 
betray reason / And deny instinct” (98). Jeffers didn’t want any notion of human consciousness 
to equate to human superiority. Consciousness makes humans question, and make unnecessary 
judgments, and pulls humans out of sync with the more-than-human world. Jeffers described the 
brutality humans are able to inflict upon others, and he could not help but remind humans of their 
“bestiality— / I mean, that humanity— / Man and no other animal—performed itself” (78). 
Jeffers had no patience or sympathy for any conceived superiority given to humanity by humans; 
Jeffers believed we are all animals, and our denial is degrading. The problems are not 
intrinsically human, but “It is the people-lovers and nation- / leaders, the human-centered, / Have 
bloody chops” (81). Those who privilege some human life over others are the ones who are most 
degraded. In war, Jeffers believed Hitler was evil because he prized one arbitrary form of 
humanity over another. But Jeffers also believed America, by entering into World War II, had 
degraded itself since it meant Americans felt they could also adjudicate human value. 
 Jeffers wrote his preface so the reader would recognize and attribute the messages of The 
Double Axe to his own thinking and philosophy. The old man in part two is a contemplative 
mouthpiece for Jeffers’ own philosophical engagement as he ponders “A conscious God—The 
question has no importance. But / I am conscious: where else / Did this consciousness come 
from” (53). The old man tries to understand expressions of energy, and the ways consciousness 
had separated humans from the more-than-human world. Once again, for Jeffers, consciousness 
was the reason humans separated from nature and legitimize destructive acts against each other 
and the more-than-human world. The caretaker’s narrative is a stream of thoughts and 
contemplations and is broken into 52 vignettes, that sometimes flow together, and other times are 
disjointed. The old man sees “‘nothing,’ … / ‘Is not alive.’ … ‘I see that all things have souls. / 
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But only God’s is immortal’” (54). Jeffers was concerned with the unnatural hierarchies of life 
human society created, but Jeffers also expressed an animistic sense that life is universal, and the 
soul is not limited to humans.  
 Jeffers questioned humanity’s ability to grasp beauty through consciousness, as the old 
man discusses how beauty  
Is in the beholder’s brain—the human mind’s translation 
of their transhuman 
Intrinsic value … Which is like beauty. It is like nobility. It 
has no name—and that’s lucky, for names 
Foul in the mouthing. (56-57)  
Intrinsic beauty exists before conscious human translation, and is only degraded by the human 
translations and evaluations. Value exists in “the endless inhuman beauty of things; / even of 
humanity and human history / The inhuman beauty” (81). The inhuman and intrinsic nature of 
beauty for Jeffers is comforting because beauty will continue to exist no matter what humanity 
does. For humans to rationalize, and assign value, is to degrade, and separate themselves from 
the beauty. Beauty not only transcends human value, but beauty translated through human value 
is lost. Jeffers believed the only way humans could interact with inhuman beauty was to try to 
exist with the more-than-human without judgment. 
 Jeffers spent most his time explicitly criticizing and reprimanding humanity, and he took 
solace in viewing the issues of humanity through the lens of deep time. Jeffers explained how  
It is more than comfort: it is the deep peace 
and final joy 
To know that the great world lives, whether man dies or 
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not. The beauty of things is not harnessed to 
human. (113) 
As can be seen throughout The Double Axe, and the rest of Jeffers’ work, he had the ability, 
through his deep time perspective, to mitigate his own misery over the damages inflicted by 
humanity, which was helpful since Jeffers devoted a large part of his life to telling other humans 
how and why they were wrong for being and acting a certain way. In a letter to the American 
Humanist Association in 1951, Jeffers told them: “‘Naturalistic Humanism’—in the modern 
sense—is no doubt a better philosophical attitude than many others; but the emphasis seems 
wrong; ‘human naturalism’ would seem to me more satisfactory, but with little accent on the 
‘human.’ Man is part of nature, but a nearly infinitesimal part” (201). Jeffers’ minimizing human 
interference through a temporal lens allowed him to engage the intrinsic beauty of the world 
without extensive emotional entanglement, or activism, to try and change humanity in the future.  
 Shortly after the conclusion of World War II, Jeffers wrote “Original Sin,” one of his 
more scathing poems that depicts a prehistoric scene of early man. After describing how “man-
brained and man-handed ground-ape[s]” brutally burn a mammoth alive, Jeffers concludes that  
I would rather  
Be a worm in a wild apple than a son of man.  
But we are what we are, and we might remember  
Not to hate any person, for all are vicious;  
And not be astonished at any evil, all are deserved;  
And not fear death; it is the only way to be cleansed. (172) 
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Humans were arrogant, and a failed experiment to Jeffers, and his belief in the human propensity 
for fear, hatred, and violence, allowed Jeffers to take solace in the notion human history would 
be a relatively short experiment in context of the earth’s history. 
 
 
Don’t 	
  Go 	
  
 Brian Calvert declares that “the immensity of the ecocide demands more. Our grief 
comes from the takers and their modern machine, which is one of violence and injury. If our 
sanity is to survive the ecocide, we must address these two pains in tandem: grief for the loss of 
things to come and the injustices that surround us” (22). One is compelled to ask: who gives a 
damn about our sanity if there is nothing left? The one tangible solution Calvert highlights comes 
from the heart of the “modern machine” in the way “Jeffers’ works had an impact on Doug 
Tompkins, the billionaire conservationist and founder of North Face … At the time of his death, 
he and his wife, Kris, had managed to preserve 2.2 million acres of land” (22). Is this the lesson 
to take from Jeffers? Humans should invest in the capitalist system, then become incredibly 
successful and use that success to buy massive tracts of land for preservation from development? 
This solution is logical, but it cannot be attributed to Jeffers.  
Brian Calvert also asserts that “Jeffers also saw humans as an integral part of an 
interconnected whole” (19), but Calvert and Dark Mountain are wrong. Jeffers did not view 
humans as integral, but instead as abominable. Jeffers did not want to help guide others through 
their grief as they reckoned with ecological disaster, Jeffers wanted to shame them. Jeffers 
worked to bring humility to humanity and did so effectively, but he gave no practical solution to 
social and environmental problems. Jeffers’ inhumanistic ethic aligned him well with Deep 
Ecology and The Dark Mountain project, and is rhetorically instructive; but, neither Jeffers’ 
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inhumanist ethic, nor any of his other works, were intended to move humans towards any 
systemic change for the better.  
Dark Mountain uses Jeffers’ example of societal withdrawal as defensible “because 
refusing to help the machine advance—refusing to tighten the ratchet further—is a deeply moral 
position” (19). Dark Mountain utilized Jeffers’ inhumanism, and his path of moving away from 
civilization, but Jeffers didn’t want other people to join him. Jeffers would rather witness the 
human apocalypse, from the edge of civilisation, than join, let alone lead, any social movement, 
no matter how much Dark Mountain’s beliefs aligned with his. The people of the Dark Mountain 
Project claim some greater goal than retreating to nature to intuit nature’s needs, but where? 
Dark Mountain proposes solutions for emotional mitigation of people who have enough 
resources to afford to spend time in nature, not systemic solutions. The preservation of sanity, 
integrity, and justice are all commendable goals but are not enough to fight against systemic 
environmental destruction. Humanity now faces much higher populations, and more 
environmental degradation4. Humans need to deal with our issues, not check out of the 
environmental fight to develop greater personal integrity and gain new appreciations for intrinsic 
beauty of the more-than-human world. Calvert talks about the ecocide as “no cause for despair; it 
is a reminder to be meaningful, to be makers instead of takers, to be of service to something—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pre-industrial revolution atmospheric CO2 ranged between 180 and 280 parts per million. As of 
January 2018, global atmospheric ppm of CO2 has risen to 407.54. In 1984, global atmospheric 
ppm of CO2 was 344.65 (Earth System Research Laboratory). The world population has grown 
from 4.8 billion people in 1984 (World Population by Year), to 7.4 billion in 2018 (U.S. and 
World Population Clock). 
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beauty, justice, loved ones, strangers, lilacs, worms. This is what Jeffers, the poet laureate of the 
ecocide, has to teach us” (23). Jeffers isn’t the poet laureate of the ecocide; Jeffers is the one 
cheering on the destruction so more-than-human beauty can reestablish its rightful place on 
earth. The problems of humanity are political, and societal, and without addressing those issues 
in pragmatic, effective ways, then Jeffers’ vision of the human experiment will be short-lived, 
and intrinsic beauty will endure, and that would be just fine by him. 
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Taylor Hastings 
Thesis Chapter 3 
Spring 2018 
We Must Think About This 
Whenever we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in 
the universe. (Muir 211) 
 
They seemed to trust one another for the division. And certainly they felt there was no 
chance of their being robbed. Perhaps they are not civilized and do not know how 
valuable money is. The poor little savages seem not to have learned the great principle of 
cheating one another. (The Log from the Sea of Cortez 93) 
 
But where does it stop? Who can we shoot? I don’t aim to starve to death before I kill the 
man that’s starving me. (The Grapes of Wrath 36)  
 
The goal of Arne Naess’ Deep Ecology movement was to convince humanity that it 
needed to change from an anthropocentric viewpoint in favor of a more ecocentric sensibility, 
but the movement failed for two reasons: a) because Naess preferred to be rhetorically 
instructive, instead of choosing to move people to action through proposing concrete solutions, 
which resulted in an ineffective movement, and b) because Deep Ecological theory makes it 
impossible for any one person to be completely faithful to all eight tenets. The Dark Mountain 
Project, a movement subsequent to Deep Ecology, has also suffered from the same flaws because 
their literary example, Robinson Jeffers, was only interested in chastising humanity for its flaws, 
not rhetorically moving people to engaging societal and environmental problems; and the 
concrete actions posed by Dark Mountain are too privileged and impractical for any substantial 
population to engage fully. A Deep Ecological message, with more forceful rhetorical leadership, 
is a more effective way of engaging people to change their orientation to the more-than-human 
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world in tandem with addressing social and environmental problems. The works of John 
Steinbeck accommodate the needs of such a movement. 
Steinbeck believed the purpose of his writing was to “bring about [a] change in 
perception by making the reader (re)discover [a] new eye” (Kopecký 113). Most of Steinbeck’s 
novels had strong more-than-human environmental presences that he utilized to bring a greater 
understanding of ecological relationships to the reader. Steinbeck pushed his reader to 
understand that everything affects everything else, and he knew there was a responsibility that 
came with that knowledge. Steinbeck believed that through the accumulation of knowledge, 
books “regulate our lives and give us a responsibility” (Demott, To a God viii), and he also 
believed his responsibility as a writer was to push humans to establish and engage a more “just 
society that would be sensitive to the natural world” (Kopecký 92). For some of Steinbeck’s 
audience, their reaction was to ban, or burn his books5; but for many others, Steinbeck’s writing 
has helped define their social and environmental conscience. Steinbeck pursued scientific 
literacy and saw the problems of the more-than-human world were tied up in hierarchical human 
systems, and only in addressing human systems could he begin to engage any semblance of a 
Deep Ecological vision. Though Steinbeck’s works are not explicitly seen as a precursor to Deep 
Ecology, his Deep Ecological respect for intrinsic value of all entities in the biosphere is 
explicitly developed in The Log from the Sea of Cortez, and it permeates much of his other work; 
where Steinbeck goes beyond Naess and Dark Mountain is when he used his ecological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Quite a few articles and scholarship on public accusations of obscenity of Steinbeck’s works. 
The most recent (and conveniently explicit) example is a book by Rick Wartzman, titled: 
Obscene in the Extreme: The Burning and Banning of John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath. 
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philosophy, as well as his understanding of human issues that degraded ecological systems, 
through The Grapes of Wrath, and many other works, to rhetorically move readers to explicitly 
address the capitalist hierarchical forces that work to oppress and degrade social and 
environmental relationships; Steinbeck’s Deep Ecological ethic, in addition to his ability to 
forcefully use writing as a call to action for people to reestablish more reciprocal, respectful, and 
connected relationships between humans and the more-than-human world makes him the most 
effective exemplary intellectual godfather of the Deep Ecological movement.  
 
 
Deep 	
  Ecological 	
  Ethic 	
  
Steinbeck is not the perfect Deep Ecologist, but as Warwick Fox elucidated in Toward a 
Transpersonal Ecology, it is impossible for a person to be wholly compatible with Deep 
Ecological theory6. The most important fundamental quality John Steinbeck shared with Deep 
Ecology was his belief in intrinsic value of all entities in the biosphere, but that quality did not 
automatically make Steinbeck an explicit precursor to Deep Ecology. Petr Kopecký’s California 
Crucible: Literary Harbingers of Deep Ecology, works extensively to bring Steinbeck’s writing 
out of the Deep Ecological shadows by utilizing prominent Deep Ecologists to validate 
Steinbeck’s ecological philosophy that embraced intrinsic value, such as Gary Snyder who 
viewed “The Log from the Sea of Cortez as a big leap for its time ‘because it calls for an ethic 
that values all life forms’” (58). Kopecký also references how “As Bill Devall himself admitted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 From Chapter One: Fox described Naess as “the bearer of so many perspectives that it would 
simply be impossible for him to be able to maintain them all at the same time without cutting the 
odd logical corner or engaging in a bit of plain bluffing” (89).  
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in private correspondence, Steinbeck expresses his own ecosophy in The Log from the Sea of 
Cortez and, therefore, ‘not including Steinbeck [in Deep Ecology] was a sin of omission’” (161). 
Steinbeck isn’t a well-known Deep Ecological thinker, and his writing did not fully adhere to all 
tenets of the philosophy, but Steinbeck’s belief in, and advocacy for, intrinsic value, as well as 
being recognized by two prominent Deep Ecologists for having his own thoughtful ecological 
philosophy, is enough evidence to view Steinbeck as a Deep Ecological writer. 
Steinbeck’s Deep Ecological engagement existed throughout his writing and can even be 
found in his personal journals. Robert Demott, in his preface to To a God Unknown, revealed in 
Steinbeck’s 1932 journal that Steinbeck believed “Each figure is a population, and the stones, the 
trees, the muscled mountains are the world—but not the world apart from man—the world and 
man—the one indescribable unit man plus his environment” (xiv). Steinbeck’s interpretation of 
ecology “underscored the relational character of life, as distinct from the hierarchical one” 
(Kopecký 74) because humans were not only connected to the more-than-human world in 
innumerable ways, but humans were also not distinguishable as superior to the rest of the world. 
The more Steinbeck engaged the more-than-human world, the more he recognized endless 
connections between humans and everything else in the biosphere.  
Throughout Steinbeck’s career, he would engage ecological complexity and show his 
audience that actions have consequences when humans adjudicate value in the more-than-human 
world. Early in To a God Unknown the main character, Joseph Wayne, rides his horse towards 
his home, and he hears “an agonizing squealing, and turning the grove’s shoulder he came in 
sight of a huge boar … [who] sat on its haunches and tearingly ate the hind quarters of a still-
squealing little pig” (5). Joseph is horrified with the cannibalistic behavior of the boar, and his 
first instinct is to kill the boar for behavior he doesn’t like, or understand. After Joseph “pulled 
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his rifle from its scabbard and aimed between the yellow eyes of the boar,” (6), he realizes his 
lack of authority in the more-than-human world. Joseph puts the gun away and says: “I’m taking 
too great power into my hands … Why he’s the father of fifty pigs and he may be the source of 
fifty more” (6). Joseph is not willing to project his own limited value system upon the boar. 
Joseph recognizes his own foolishness in thinking he should adjudicate against a boar, who may 
be critically important to the health of his species, and therefore the entire ecosystem. Steinbeck, 
much like Joseph, saw the limitations of his own singular perspective, and Joseph’s 
unwillingness to adjudicate value shows a respect for intrinsic value.  
 The fact that Steinbeck was also an informal, yet methodical, student of ecological 
science can most effectively be seen through his friendship with Ed Ricketts. Ricketts was a 
marine biologist, and Kopecký argues that “The cooperative element, and interrelatedness of 
organisms, and the holistic conception of life were three significant lessons Ricketts taught to 
Steinbeck” (55). Rickett’s friendship heavily influenced Steinbeck in the way he engaged the 
world, and the ecological lessons learned by Steinbeck from Ricketts are most clearly elucidated 
in The Log from the Sea of Cortez through their marine expedition.  
 Steinbeck’s mission for the expedition in Log was to garner a greater understanding of 
the ways coastal marine ecosystems functioned. When explaining the process of taking animals 
for scientific study, Steinbeck shows a strong awareness of the interrelated nature of life: 
We take a tiny colony of soft corals from a rock in a little water world. And that 
isn’t terribly important to the tide pool. Fifty miles away the Japanese shrimp 
boats are dredging with overlapping scoops, bringing up tons of shrimps, rapidly 
destroying the species so that it may never come back, and with the species 
destroying the ecological balance of the whole region. That isn’t very important in 
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the world. And thousands of miles away the great bombs are falling, and the stars 
are not moved thereby. None of it is important or all of it is. (3) 
Steinbeck engaged the results of actions to encourage his audience to understand the complexity 
of ecological relationships with the reader. Steinbeck pushed his reader in the final sentence of 
the passage to recognize the intrinsic importance of every entity, and every action; everything is 
connected and any change has ramifications for everything else. Steinbeck also wanted to 
introduce to the reader his belief that everything has consequences early in the text. Ecology does 
not take any factor for granted because any individual piece, even at a great distance, can 
dramatically change the nature of the whole ecological puzzle. Steinbeck, and the rest of his 
research group, were taking animal specimens to study, and even though he believed the 
knowledge gained through his endeavor was worth the cost, Steinbeck was clear with his 
audience that there would be real effects from altering environments, regardless of how humans 
assign value to coastal ecosystems. Steinbeck did not have a romantic vision of ecosystems 
where every calm stasis is the norm; instead, Steinbeck learned (and respected) that a healthy 
ecosystem is one where “Everything [eats] everything else with a furious exuberance” (41). 
Steinbeck did not pretend to understand every mysterious encounter with the more-than-human, 
but he did strive to understand more of the incomprehensibly complicated nature of ecology.  
In his study of ecological science, and the innumerable factors that can influence and 
change ecosystems, Steinbeck turned his attention to the ways humans have tried to intervene in 
natural processes. Steinbeck showed that not only is it nearly impossible to understand the full 
ramifications of any action, but he also showed how not being well versed in the full ecological 
picture can be destructive. Steinbeck highlights how humans can misread an ecosystem and 
create detrimental effects through an example of humans hunting hawks that preyed upon the 
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willow grouse in an attempt to save the game bird in Norway: “An ecological analysis into the 
relational aspects of the situation disclosed that a parasitic disease … in its incipient stages, the 
disease so reduced the flying speed of the grouse that the mildly ill individuals became easy prey 
for the hawks” (120). The reduced predation from the hawks allowed the disease to flourish 
through the willow grouse population. The result was a totally depleted, and diseased, willow 
grouse community: “Thus the presumed enemies of the grouse [the hawks], by controlling the 
epizootic aspects of the disease, proved to be friends in disguise” (120). The humans were unable 
to restore the willow grouse, even though they had a specific intention of helping the bird re-
establish its population. Steinbeck would not insist any comprehensive understanding of ecology, 
but he did insist on the incredibly complicated nature of ecosystems, and the need for thoughtful, 
and respectful, relationships between humans and the more-than-human.  
 Steinbeck implored humanity to be more wary and respectful of the more-than-human by 
showing how humans have the tendency, and ability, to critically disrupt and destroy 
environments without fully understanding the ramifications of their actions. Throughout Log, 
Steinbeck intentionally engaged thoughtful speculation of potential ecological disturbances in 
order for readers to understand full ramifications of seemingly minor changes. For instance, 
Steinbeck pointed out that “The disappearance of plankton, although the components are 
microscopic, would probably in a short time eliminate every living thing in the sea and change 
the whole of man’s life, if it did not through seismic disturbance of balance eliminate all life on 
the globe” (178). Though the elimination of plankton is a dramatic example, Steinbeck wanted to 
make the point because of the way humans had historically been blind and thoughtless in 
interactions with the more-than-human world. Steinbeck was especially critical of Western 
society’s engagement with the more-than-human world, and he believed “We in the United 
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States have done so much to destroy our own resources, our timber, our land, our fishes, that we 
should be taken as a horrible example and our methods avoided by any government and people 
enlightened enough to envision a continuing economy” (207). Steinbeck understood the dangers 
of intervening in more-than-human processes when humans were well informed of the potential 
ecological complications, which made him more critical of the systems that did intervene in 
blatantly ignorant ways, and so he advocated for minimizing uninformed destructive human 
practices. Steinbeck wanted people to reconcile the wasteful treatment of land, and timber, and 
any other critically destructive practice as critically destructive, and not just the byproduct of 
human progress.  
Steinbeck wrote Log to let humans know what the consequences of environmentally 
degrading actions are, and he not only pushed readers to recognize the intrinsic and relational 
value of all entities within the biosphere, but he also highlighted the ways humans are wasteful 
and have gone far beyond satisfying any Deep Ecological notion of “vital needs.” Another 
example of mass degradation of ecosystems takes place when Steinbeck encounters Japanese 
shrimp boats. Steinbeck describes “twelve boats in the combined fleet including the mother ship, 
and they were doing a very systematic job, not only of taking every shrimp from the bottom, but 
every other living thing as well” (204). Not only are there multiple large vessels operating, but 
they worked quickly and efficiently because “Any animal which escaped must have been very 
fast indeed, for not even the sharks got away” (204-205). Steinbeck used the shrimp boats to 
highlight how effectively destructive humans can be: “The big scraper … deposited many tons of 
animals on the deck … sierras; pompano of several species … hammer-heads; eagle rays and 
butterfly rays; small tuna; catfish … And there were bottom-samples with anemones and grass-
like gorgonians. The sea bottom must have been scraped completely clean” (205), but also how 
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wasteful and dismissive humans are. The aftermath of dragging every living thing onto the boats 
was “Fish … thrown overboard immediately, and only the shrimps kept. The sea was littered 
with dead fish” (205). Steinbeck’s description is devastating. Humans do not simply manipulate 
ecosystems in small ways, but they have the capability, and a willingness, to destroy entire 
ecosystems so they can salvage a single small portion. The fishing boats dredging the seafloor 
for a small amount of shrimp is like cutting down an old growth forest for a few bushels of 
acorns. Steinbeck views the actions of the shrimp boats as abhorrent, and his analysis forces the 
reader to see the greater implications of a multitude of reckless actions. Steinbeck, throughout 
The Log, kept returning to the interrelated nature of ecology because he wanted the audience to 
know that no matter the scale of intervention and manipulation of ecosystems, the consequences 
are real; the removal of a coral is as disruptive to a tide pool, as the dredging of the seafloor is to 
the Sea of Cortez, as the bombs falling on the other side of the world is to the whole of the earth. 
 Steinbeck extrapolates the human caused result of irresponsible fishing, and posits that 
the “Japanese will obviously soon clean out the shrimps of the region. And it is not true that a 
species thus attacked comes back. The disturbed balance often gives a new species ascendancy 
and destroys forever the old relationship. In addition to the shrimps, these boats kill and waste 
many hundreds of tons of fish every day” (206). Steinbeck calls attention to the infinite nature of 
ecological relations and how the depleted ecosystem will never return to its former state. 
Steinbeck was not only gaining a greater ecological perspective for himself, but he also pushed 
the reader to develop a more complex ecological perspective.  
Steinbeck’s endeavor to learn more about ecology helped him engage and embrace 
intrinsic value of all life, which is fundamental to a Deep Ecological ethic, and also pushed him 
further to develop a holistic and relational orientation to the world. When looking at a tide pool, 
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Steinbeck discusses how “a man looking at reality brings his own limitations to the world. If he 
has strength and energy of mind the tide pool stretches both ways, digs back to electrons and 
leaps space into the universe and fights out of the moment into non-conceptual time. Then 
ecology has a synonym which is ALL” (71-72). Humans bring their own personal limitations to 
understanding the world, so Steinbeck pushed his reader to go develop a greater strength and 
energy of mind so they could engage with the more-than-human world more effectively. 
Steinbeck wanted to develop his audience’s ecological fluency because he believed that if people 
were more informed and had a sense of the innumerable connections in ecological relationships, 
then they would be more cautious and responsible when engaging the more-than-human world, 
even through relatively passive actions, like purchasing fresh caught shrimp.  
Steinbeck was persistent in trying to elucidate his ecological vision to his audience 
throughout Log. Even though the expedition’s “interest lay in relationships of animal to animal. 
If one observes in this relational sense, it seems that species are only commas in a sentence” 
(178). Steinbeck broke down hierarchical thinking by putting all life on one continuous plane, or 
“sentence,” to further help the reader understand that everything is related. Steinbeck began by 
engaging the relationality of animals in environments, but he was unable to ignore forces of the 
larger environmental whole. Steinbeck ultimately believed “One merges into another, groups 
melt into ecological groups until the time when what we know as life meets and enters what we 
think of as non-life: barnacle and rock, rock and earth, earth and tree, tree and rain and air. And 
the units nestle into the whole and are inseparable from it” (178). Ecology for Steinbeck means 
all, including humans, and Steinbeck worked to establish how easily and thoroughly humans are 
able to disrupt, and degrade, the more-than-human world 
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Steinbeck was forceful in his criticism of broadly negative human societal issues, but he 
did not disparage individuals. Instead, Steinbeck utilized his ecological perspective to assess 
humans as a species through a scientific lens, and catalogued the scientific human traits in Log. 
Steinbeck shows how humans  
do not objectively observe our own species as a species … If we used the same 
smug observation on ourselves that we do on hermit crabs we would be forced to 
say … “It is one diagnostic trait of Homo sapiens that groups of individuals are 
periodically infected with a feverish nervousness which causes the individual to 
turn on and destroy, not only his own kind, but the works of his own kind.” (15) 
Steinbeck viewed the human biological drive towards survival, and procreation, as natural as the 
need for conflict. Steinbeck sardonically classifying humans as Homo sapiens also removed any 
superior standing in a biological sense and therefore subtly dismantled hierarchical notions. 
Steinbeck believed humans as a whole are not an enlightened, or superior, species; humans are 
subject to bouts of irrationality and can affect the more-than-human world in profound ways.  
Steinbeck was not as critical of humans as Robinson Jeffers, though. After watching the 
mass degradation from the Japanese shrimp boats, Steinbeck does not criticize the individuals on 
the boats. Instead, he claims that “We like the people on this boat very much. They were good 
men, but they were caught in a large destructive machine, good men doing a bad thing” (206). 
Steinbeck’s issue was with human hierarchical structures that suppressed traits of individuality 
and critical thinking; and aside from societal tendencies towards violence and destruction, 
Steinbeck saw the individual human as predominantly good. When the expedition goes into San 
Diego, Steinbeck is captivated by the fact that “All about us the war bustled, although we had no 
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war; steel and thunder, powder and men—the men preparing thoughtlessly, like dead men, to 
destroy things … The military mind must limit its thinking to be able to perform its function at 
all” [emphasis added] (35). The successful implementation of the military mind kept soldiers 
from thinking for themselves. There is no incentive for the hierarchical structure of the military 
to encourage free thought, or for the Japanese fishermen to fully realize the extent of their 
environmental destruction. The result of soldiers coming to terms with the fact that their actions 
would result in “families torn to pieces, a thousand generations influenced” (35) would dissolve 
any effective fighting force. Steinbeck was careful to be critical of systems and not of 
individuals. The mindless soldier “is too humble to take the responsibility for thinking. The 
whole structure if his world would be endangered if he permitted himself to think” (35). 
Steinbeck wrote to make humans more aware of the systems that opposed thoughtful and 
engaged action. War represented a feverish nervousness to Steinbeck, but war was not the most 
insidious and destructive human creation. 
 War for Steinbeck was instead one of the many ways the most destructive human practice 
of capitalism thrived. At the beginning of Sweet Thursday Steinbeck proclaims:  
The canneries themselves fought the war by getting the limit taken off fish and 
catching them all. It was done for patriotic reasons, but that didn’t bring the fish 
back. As with the oysters in Alice, ‘They’d eaten every one.’ It was the same 
noble impulse that stripped the forests of the West and right now is pumping 
water out of California’s earth faster than it can rain back in. (1) 
The novel has almost no other engagement with wartime activity, which makes Steinbeck’s 
claim so forceful. Steinbeck put this line on the first page of his entire novel because he wanted 
no ambiguity of his message. Steinbeck could have given a more simplistic background to the 
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novel about the people of Cannery Row, or withheld judgment, but Steinbeck wanted people to 
know the truth. Regardless of good people existing within a bad system, Steinbeck wanted 
readers to recognize the destruction, limitations, and ramifications of irresponsible human action. 
Steinbeck didn’t adjudicate the necessity of war, but he did make sure people considered the real 
environmental consequences of patriotic action.  
 Capitalism profits from war and teaches people to act irresponsibly towards other 
humans. Steinbeck addresses his own objection to the bizarre qualities of capitalism in Log: 
There is a strange duality in the human which makes for an ethical paradox. We 
have definitions of good qualities and of bad; not changing things, but generally 
considered good and bad throughout the ages and throughout the species. Of the 
good, we think always of wisdom, tolerance, kindliness, generosity, humility; and 
the qualities of cruelty, greed, self-interest, graspingness, and rapacity are 
universally considered undesirable. And yet in our structure of society, the so-
called and considered good qualities are invariable concomitants of failure, while 
the bad ones are the cornerstones of success. (80) 
Steinbeck believed the introduction of capitalistic hierarchies changed human engagement with 
other humans and the more-than-human in terrible ways. Steinbeck was confronted with the 
unnatural function of capitalism when hiring Mexican children to collect specimens for his 
expedition. The children are paid out in one large sum, and “They seemed to trust one another 
for the division … The poor little savages seem not to have learned the great principle of 
cheating one another” (93). The notion of being civilized is to exercise capitalistic tendencies of 
greed and the willingness to cheat others. Steinbeck playfully refers to the honest children as 
savages, when he really sees their behavior as more decent and civil. Steinbeck wanted to be 
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very explicit in his critique of the destruction of capitalism in Log, but his most effective rebuke 
comes from The Grapes of Wrath. 
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 During Steinbeck’s lifetime, he saw human society, through technological advancements, 
begin to impose itself more forcefully upon the more-than-human world. The Grapes of Wrath 
represents Steinbeck’s most effective rhetorical appeal to humanity to make fundamental 
changes. Grapes won the National Book Award, the Pulitzer Prize for fiction, and was an 
instrumental in Steinbeck winning the Nobel Prize for literature. Robert Demott, in his 
introduction to the novel, claims that Grapes “resolutely entered both the American 
consciousness and its conscience. Few novels can make that claim” (xi). Steinbeck published 
Grapes twelve years before The Log from the Sea of Cortez because he was concerned for 
humanity in the aftermath of the Dust Bowl and the Great Depression. Steinbeck also utilized 
Grapes to bring awareness of the ways “human behavior aimed at the control of nature [was] 
self-destructive because … of the interdependence between people and the environment” 
(Kopecký 82-83). Steinbeck wrote the book to make people think of the hierarchical power 
structures that affected their lives and environments, and to move them towards action. In fact, 
Grapes was widely banned because it was so effective at making people consider their own place 
in society through its challenge to the effects of capitalism. Steinbeck could have left out any 
criticism of capitalism, and still had a compelling narrative about a family with a streak of bad 
luck, but Steinbeck wanted his audience to understand that the Joad family was not simply the 
victim of bad luck; instead, the plight of the Joad family was a logical result to capitalistic 
processes.  
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 Steinbeck begins his critique of capitalism early in the novel. The novel takes place 
during the Dust Bowl, where unsustainable farming practices sapped the land of its vitality. As 
the environment changes, men and women are unable to make ends meet through farming. So, 
they go to the bank help them get by in the short-term. Eventually the farmers fall short on their 
harvest one too many times, and the banks foreclose on the farmer so they can sell the farms to 
people who don’t care about the land. The new owners only care about profit. The farmers are 
allowed by the new owners to continue farming as tenants, but once a cheaper means of 
production arises, the people are forced to move out, and move on. Steinbeck intentionally refers 
to capitalism, and more specifically “The bank [as] the monster [that] has to have profits all the 
time. It can’t wait. It’ll die … When the monster stops growing, it dies. It can’t stay one size” 
(32). Capitalism is represented as the monster because of what it does to working people. 
Steinbeck asserts that, in a capitalist system, every decision on the farm is made for the 
“health” of the banks. Bankers and farm owners “don’t like to [enact unsustainable farming 
practices]. But the monster’s sick. Something’s happened to the monster” (33). When the tenant 
farmers declare that “you’ll kill the land with cotton,” the owners reply: “We know. We’ve got to 
take cotton quick before our land dies. Then we’ll sell the land” (33). Steinbeck argues that 
farmers would not be so irresponsible with their farms if not for the constant threat of a capitalist 
hierarchy taking their land away. The process of removing good people from their relationship to 
the land is complicated, and not all the owners are bad people who only care about profit, but 
owners realize that “all of them were caught in something larger than themselves” (31), and if 
they don’t favor profit over people then their livelihood is likely to be destroyed as well. The 
abstracted monster of capitalism favors the tractor over tenant farmers because “One man on a 
tractor can take the place of twelve or fourteen families. Pay him a wage and take all the crop” 
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(33). The math works out. One man on a tractor not only allows for more efficient farming, but a 
tractor doesn’t eat like fourteen families, and all excess resources represent potential profit. 
Steinbeck shows how the workers, who know ways to sustainably engage with the more-than-
human environment, are effectively alienated by the capitalist system.  
 As the people are alienated and pushed off the farmlands they have worked, the owners 
and the bankers are described as obscure pieces in the larger capitalist hierarchical power 
structure. The farm owners are able to displace tenant farmers with impunity because “The bank 
is something else than men. It happens that every man in a bank hates what the bank does, and 
yet the bank does it. The bank is something more than men, I tell you. It’s the monster. Men 
made it, but they can’t control it” (33). Steinbeck shows how capitalism abstracts labor to 
legitimize dehumanized action7; the bank is something else, or the bank is something more than 
men. Men created the bank, and they hate it, but people cannot control the bank.  
The angry farmers want to fight back, but the source of power is too far removed and 
diffused. One farmer intends to shoot a new tractor driver, whose job replaces multiple tenant 
farmers, but realizes killing the man would be useless as he asks “where does it stop? Who can 
we shoot? I don’t aim to starve to death before I kill the man that’s starving me” (36). The 
pursuit of capital turns people into numbers, and with technological advancement it doesn’t make 
mathematical sense to use tenant farmers. Steinbeck shows how the small farmer has no 
incentive to destroy his home, or his environment, because the small farmer understands the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Steinbeck made references to Marx in Grapes, and though he didn’t explicitly align himself to 
Marx’s communist theory, the novel was widely hailed as a “great proletarian novel” (Wald 
671). 
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consequences of monoculture crops of cotton, and other reckless practices. The small farmer has 
an incentive to pay attention to the needs of the environment and not engage in superficial 
accounting that champions short-term profit over long-term viability. The larger capitalist system 
fundamentally fractures and destroys people’s ability to make positive choices and maintain 
some semblance of a reciprocal relationship with their home environments. Steinbeck wrote for 
society to understand the insidious capitalistic process that quietly destroyed ecological 
relationships people had with the land. 
The result of utilizing technology instead of people to grow food is further alienation 
from healthy human engagement with the more-than-human world. Steinbeck describes how 
“The tractors came over the roads and into the fields, great crawlers moving like insects, having 
the incredible strength of insects” (35). The power of the machines is far greater than any tenant 
farmer. The machines are more efficient, and therefore more profitable, but the human is lost. 
Steinbeck also shows how “The man sitting in the iron seat did not look like a man; gloved, 
goggled, rubber dust mask over nose and mouth, he was part of the monster, a robot in the seat” 
(35). The man who drives the tractor is physically assimilated by the machine, and loses his 
humanity in the process. Capitalism prefers the machine because of its efficiency, but the 
superficial accounting of capitalism has consequences. 
Steinbeck saw the loss of the human/more-than-human relationship represented in the 
tractor driver to be devastating: “He could not see the land as it was, he could not smell the land 
as it smelled; his feet did not stamp the clods or feel the warmth and power of the earth. He sat in 
an iron seat and stepped on iron pedals” (35). The worker has no relationship to the land, and 
therefore “loved the land no more than the bank loved the land … proud of the power he could 
not control. And when that crop grew, and was harvested, no man had crumbled a hot clod in his 
	   	   	  
	  
70	  
fingers and let the earth sift past his fingertips. No man had touched the seed, or lusted for the 
growth” (36). Steinbeck laments the relational loss throughout the novel, and wanted his readers 
to see that the Dust Bowl was the consequence of irresponsible farming. Tenant farmers, who 
have a strong incentive to engage in a relationship with the land based on reciprocity and respect, 
being replaced by tractor drivers, who are physically removed from the land, resulted in “Men 
[who] ate what they had not raised, had no connection with the bread. The land bore under iron, 
and under iron gradually died; for it was not loved or hated, it had no prayers or curses” (36). 
Steinbeck showed how technological advancement was the result of capitalist impulses, and land 
farmed through hierarchical calculation and domination, instead of a strong relational aspect, was 
doomed to failure.  
Steinbeck holistic relational ethic is similar to other prominent environmental thinkers 
and activists, including, most prominently, Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic, which argued for a 
responsible and reciprocal relationship with the more-than-human world. Leopold believed 
more-than-human interference could be judged as “right when it tends to preserve the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (262). 
Steinbeck believed that monoculture farming massive tracts of land fundamentally disturbs 
integrity, stability, and beauty, just as scraping the seafloor clean with the intention of harvesting 
shrimp has massive ecological consequences. Steinbeck believed “nitrates are not the land, nor 
phosphates and the length of fiber in the cotton is not the land. Carbon is not a man, nor salt nor 
water nor calcium. He is all these, but he is much more, much more; and the land is so much 
more than its analysis” (115). Technology and science, through heavy machinery and fertilizers, 
had suddenly allowed humanity to manipulate environments so much more effectively than 
before, and Steinbeck wanted the world to comprehend how dangerous the physical, 
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mathematical, and abstract chemical processes used to manipulate land could be. The essence of 
man, and the essence of the land aren’t quantifiable, and cannot be understood without intimate 
engagement. Even bonding with an environment does not allow for any measure of control; 
bonding only leads to basic understanding and an appreciation for the dynamic nature of an 
environment.  
 The narrative structure of Grapes oscillates between the Joad family, who are displaced 
from their farm, and vignettes of the larger national/capitalist narrative of people being displaced 
and preyed upon. When the Joads try to sell possessions they cannot take on their move to 
California, they are manipulated into taking almost no money in return, and the family feels 
“weary and frightened because they had gone against a system they did not understand and it had 
beaten them” (97). Steinbeck wants the reader to recognize that the plight of the Joad family is 
the result of the capitalist hierarchy, and not unique. As the farmers leave the fields, they are 
further exposed to the cold nature of capitalism. Some displaced farmers need transportation, and 
used car salesmen are sure to squeeze every penny out of their pockets: “Get ‘em under 
obligation. Make ‘em take up your time. Don’t let ‘em forget they’re takin’ your time. People are 
nice, mostly. They hate to put you out. Make ‘em put you out, an’ then sock it to ‘em” (62). 
Farmers can’t assimilate before they are ruined because of the capitalist infrastructure waiting to 
prey upon the farmer’s misfortune. Capitalism doesn’t care if you have a family, or you have a 
limited amount of money. Gotta keep movin’, Get ‘em out in a jalopy. Let them know they have 
been taking up your time!  
The displaced farmers are severely jarred by the lack of humanity and trust in the world 
beyond their farms and cannot square the capitalist sensibility with their own. One displaced man 
muses that “You go steal that tire an’ you’re a thief, but he tried to steal your four dollars for a 
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busted tire. They call that sound business” (121). Steinbeck’s vignettes become more explicit in 
his critique of the systemic evils of capitalism as the story progresses. In one section, Steinbeck 
addresses how capitalism tries to convince people that “business is noble and not the curious 
ritualized thievery they know it is; that business men are intelligent in spite of their records of 
their stupidity; that they are kind and charitable in spite of the principles of sound business” 
(155). Steinbeck accuses “business” of being stupid, uncharitable, and ritualized thievery, and he 
wants readers to know that sound business has served to disenfranchise honest people. 
 Steinbeck forced readers to deal with the insidious nature of capitalism. Not only are the 
farmers displaced and manipulated, but they are also systematically rationalized as less-than in a 
society where the amount of money in your bank account is more important than your honesty, 
decency, or willingness to work. The car salesmen, the waitresses in the diners on the road to 
California, and just about every other character in the book who isn’t forced from their homes, 
thinks of the people displaced from the Midwest as, per the California landowners watching the 
hordes of migrants, “These goddamned Okies … dirty and ignorant. They’re degenerate, sexual 
maniacs … They bring disease, they’re filthy. We can’t have them in the schools” (283). 
Steinbeck establishes the humanity of the Okies throughout the novel and then exposes the 
reader to the processes of othering that rationalize treating the farmers badly. The Okies have no 
chance with the lack of a social safety net, and their unfamiliarity with the capitalistic mindset. 
The Okies are set at a disadvantage that only grows as they get further from home with fewer 
resources. 
 Steinbeck’s most powerful rhetorical moment comes when he is contemplating the 
ramifications of capitalism and technology, and Steinbeck tells the reader that a “tractor does two 
things—it turns the land and turns us off the land. There is little difference between this tractor 
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and a tank. The people are driven, intimidated, hurt by both” (151). Steinbeck finishes the 
thought by telling the reader that “We must think about this” (151). We must think about this. 
Steinbeck moved narratively to explicitly engaging with his audience and forcing his reader to 
think about the ways capitalism reorients and distorts how humans treat each other—and in the 
larger context of the book—the ways capitalism degrades human relationships with the more-
than-human world. “We must think about this” signifies a challenge to readers to push 
themselves into deeper questioning of their fundamental value systems, and how their values 
may be incompatible with their complicity in the hierarchical capitalist system. “We must think 
about this” moves the reader to make changes to the ways they engage their world. 
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Steinbeck was more forceful than Naess in rhetorically motivating people towards 
substantive changes to their relationships with other humans and the more-than-human world. 
Steinbeck not only used his novels and works of nonfiction to inform his audiences to the 
hierarchical forces of degradation, but he also used his extensive influence from his writing to 
address “environmental problems in his numerous encounters with the leading decision-makers, 
including four US presidents, whom he served as an advisor” (Kopecký 98). Steinbeck utilized 
his influence where it would be most effective, and though he believed in the destructive force of 
capitalism, Steinbeck was also pragmatic in advocating better environmental policies to powerful 
people within existing power structures. 
Steinbeck also recognized the importance of addressing human issues if humans were to 
enact any substantive changes to their relationship with the more-than-human world. Steinbeck 
didn’t write Log to simply discuss sea creatures; Steinbeck wanted to understand the way the 
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world functioned ecologically, and wanted his audience to find common ground with his 
ecological philosophy, as well as push them to understand the human capacity for environmental 
destruction. Steinbeck didn’t write Grapes to simply inform humans about the dangers of the 
capitalist hierarchical system; Steinbeck explicitly pushed readers to understand the real-world 
effects of capitalism in an attempt to make positive, ameliorative changes to human relationships 
with other humans, as well as engaging more thoughtfully with the more-than-human. Arne 
Naess’ creation of Deep Ecology is important, but he was unable to move people to action; 
Robinson Jeffers’ poetry is powerful, but he was easily marginalized when his views became 
more controversial; John Steinbeck effectively challenged the status quo, and he was so 
dangerous in his ability to move people that opponents to Steinbeck’s messages fearfully 
resorted to banning and burning his books. Steinbeck is a logical intellectual godfather of the 
Deep Ecological movement because he didn’t simply ask his audience to make changes to the 
ways they functioned in the world—he pushed them. 
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